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I. INTRODUCTION
This article analyzes protections offered to employees who have
been discharged because they complained about violations of the
federal Occupational Safety and Health Act ("OSHAct").1 These
employees seek restoration to the positions they would have occupied
but for their terminations. They have several available avenues of
recourse. This article focuses on two of these avenues and navigates
the intersection between them. After a general discussion of
whistleblowers, the article addresses how an employee can use section
11(c) of the OSHAct.' Then it describes the state common law tort of
retaliatory discharge, or discharge in violation of public policy.
Part III describes the intersection of these two causes of action.
The article assesses everal road blocks to common law tort recovery.
These include the desire to avoid the appearance of creating a private
cause of action under the OSHAct, reluctance to utilize common law
rights and remedies when a related statutory provision exists, and
federal preemption. The article concludes that none of these concepts
need prevent state courts from affording their citizens the protection
of the common law tort. Rather than going on forays into these
labyrinthine areas, courts would do better to address the fundamental
policy questions inherent in a decision to allow or disallow the public
policy tort.
A. Whistleblowers
"Dissenters and whistleblowers rarely win popularity contests or Dale Carnegie
awards. They are frequently irritating and unsettling. These qualities, however, do not
necessarily make their views wrong or unhelpful. . . . "
Various definitions of "whistleblower" have been put forward.'
One state supreme court justice observed:
1. Pub. L. No. 91-596, 84 Stat. 1590 (1970) (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-78 (2000)). All
references to the OSHAct refer to the federal statute. State Occupational Safety and Health
Acts ("State OSHActs") will be referred to specifically by state.
2. 29 U.S.C. § 660(c) (2000).
3. Greenberg v. Kmetko, 840 F.2d 467, 477 (7th Cir. 1988) (Cudahy, J., dissenting).
4. For a thorough discussion of various whistleblowing scenarios see Terry Morehead
Dworkin & Janet P. Near, Whistleblowing Statutes: Are they Working?, 25 AM. Bus. L.J. 241,
243-44 (1987).
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The term is derived from the act of an English bobby blowing his
whistle upon becoming aware of the commission of a crime to alert
other law enforcement officers and the public within the zone of
danger. Like this corner law enforcement official, the whistleblower
sounds the alarm when wrongdoing occurs on his or her 'beat,'
which is usually within a large organization.
While many contemporary definitions of the term have been
advanced, no one definition captures the essence of a
'whistleblower' - the public need and benefit, the conflict of
loyalties to the employer and to the public good, and the
corresponding personal anguish involved.
For the purposes of this article, a whistleblower is a worker who
finds evidence of a serious violation of law on the part of the
employer or its agents, and who takes specific, active, steps to bring
that violation to the attention of authorities. Those authorities may
be company officials, in which case the worker is an "internal"
whistleblower. Or the worker may notify public authorities, often by
speaking to the relevant regulatory agencies. The worker is then an
"external" whistleblower. Some courts make significant distinctions
between internal and external whistleblowers.6
The usefulness of whistleblowers is well-documented,' as is their
plight.' Many employees are afraid of reprisal for whistleblowing,
5. Winters v. Houston Chronicle Publ'g Co., 795 S.W. 2d 723, 727 (Tx. 1990) (Doggett, J.,
concurring) (citation omitted). Justice Doggett continued:
Employees who protest corporate wrongdoing are ... not invoking the whistle of
authority but the whistle of desperation. Their action resembles that of a person who
blows a whistle to bring help when threatened with assault on the city streets. The
hope is that the law will arrive and protect not only the person's rights but the peace
and good order of the community. In a society where the law operates well, the hope
is also that just wearing the whistle on a street, or threatening to use it in the corporate
setting, may serve to ward off misconduct.
Id. at 727-28 (quoting Alan Westin, Introduction in WHISTLE BLOWING! LOYALTY AND
DISSENT IN THE CORPORATION 1, 2 (Alan Westin ed.,1981).
6. See infra text accompanying notes 161-64.
7. See Chad A. Atkins, Note The Whistleblower Exception to the At-Will Employment
Doctrine: An Economic Analysis of Environmental Policy Enforcement, 70 DENV. U. L. REV.
537, 538 n.10 (1993). One member of Congress has asserted that 75 to 80% of information that
agency inspector generals act upon comes from whistleblowers. 135 Cong. Rec. H752 (daily ed.
Mar. 21, 1989) (statement of Rep. Horton). For one of the few scholarly articles less
sympathetic to the whistleblower, see Martin H. Malin, Protecting the Whistleblower from
Retaliatory Discharge, 16 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 277 (1983).
8. See David Culp, Whistleblowers: Corporate Anarchists or Heros? Towards a Judicial
Perspective, 13 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 109, 112-13 (1995) ("Reviled by management and
shunned by co-workers, whistleblowers face a lonely existence.") Whistleblowers also face a
myriad of personal problems: legal expenses, loss of earnings; lost homes; lost marriages. See id.
For an eye-opening list of tactics used to undercut the whistleblower's effectiveness see Thomas
M. Devine & Donald G. Aplin, Whistleblower Protection - The Gap between the Law and
Reality, 31 How. L.J. 223, 224-27 (1988). For a suggested plan of action for the person
considering whistleblowing, see id. at 236-38.
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and their fears lead to silence.' One court described whistleblowers
as professional, upper and middle level employees with lengthy
tenure but no contractual job security, who are at an age where, if
terminated, they will find it difficult to replace fringe benefits like
insurance and retirement plans.o The court's generalizations
concerning age and status may not hold true as often in the
occupational safety and health context, because rank and file workers
of any age are at least as likely as managers to observe and report
violations." Hands-on workers are motivated by self interest as well
as by altruism, because they fear for their own safey on the job.
Whistleblowers of any station fear consequences, ranging from
unlikely but terrifying physical reprisals2 to retaliatory job action.
The latter is a realistic concern, as evidenced by the number of cases
on point in the legal reports across the United States.
9. "In 1980, 19 percent who witnessed significant misconduct cited fear of reprisal as the
reason for remaining silent. By 1983 the figure was 37%." Devine & Aplin, supra note 8, at 230
(citing OFFICE OF MERIT SYSTEMS REVIEW AND STUDIES, MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION
BOARD, BLOWING THE WHISTLE IN THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT: A COMPARATIVE
ANALYSIS OF 1980 AND 1983 SURVEY FINDINGS 31, 34 (1984); OFFICE OF MERIT SYSTEMS
REVIEW AND STUDIES, MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD, WHISTLEBLOWING AND THE
FEDERAL EMPLOYEE 27, 29 (1981)); see also Culp, supra note 8, at 121 n.113 (quoting Senator
Levin for the report that 70% of federal workers with knowledge of waste and inefficiency do
not report it because of ear of retaliation); but see William D. Kimball, New Developments in
the Whistleblower Protection Act: Some Relief for Federal Managers, THE ARMY LAWYER, Dec.
1996, at 10 (reporting an increased aggressiveness by the U.S. Office of Special Counsel in
prosecuting whistleblower protection cases in light of the Whistleblower Protection Act of 1989
and its 1994 amendments).
10. Boyle v. Vista Eyewear, Inc., 700 S.W. 2d 859, 877-78 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985). See id. at
878 n.12 (listing retaliatory discharge cases, along with each plaintiff's job title and number of
years with the company and showing that all were upper level managers or supervisors with long
years of service).
11. One commentator finds it "a basic axiom that employee participation in monitoring
and improving workplace safety and health is indispensable." James S. Swain, Protecting
Individual Employees, Is it Safe to Complain about Safety?, 9 U. BRIDGEPORT L. REV. 59, 139
(1988). Although Swain cited no support for this assertion, the court in Reich v. Hoy Shoe Co.,
Inc., 32 F. 3d 361 (8th Cir., 1994) observed:
Congress recognized employees to be a valuable and knowledgeable source of
information regarding work place safety and health hazards. Congress was aware of
the shortage of federal and state occupational safety inspectors, and placed great
reliance on employee assistance in enforcing the Act . . . . [I]t is clear that without
employee cooperation, even an army of inspectors could not keep America's work
places safe."
Id. at 368 (internal quotations and citations omitted).
12. See infra note 130 and accompany text.
13. The law makes some attempt to handle heavy handed, provable, job reprisals, like
termination. But the employee is also subject to social and psychological pressures that are far
beyond the reach of the law. See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER D. STONE, WHERE THE LAW ENDS: THE
SOCIAL CONTROL OF CORPORATE BEHAVIOR 213-16, 230 (1975) ("Those who labor for [the
American business corporation] are going to be concerned with providing for their wives and
children, the approval of their peers, and 'moving up' in the organization."); Devine & Aplin,
supra note 8, at 224-29.
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Popular culture often adulates the whistleblower. He is por-
trayed as a knight in shining armor, or as a martyr; he is someone who
sees something wrong going on and tells the world, despite the
possibility of harm to himself.14 It is in the public good that workplace
hazards be revealed and corrected." It is even in the corporate
good. When a statute is systematically violated in a meaningful way
we hope to have the violations stopped, especially if the statute
touches on health and safety. We want to encourage those who have
the best knowledge to blow the whistle. "Often the very act of
whistleblowing indicates that governmental regulation has been
inadequate to protect the public; it represents a breakdown of
systems whose very goal is to make sure that misconduct does not
occur in the first place."07 So we offer whistleblowers some monetary
compensation for the adverse employment actions they may suffer.
A judge may speak of shielding citizens from retaliation, but the
wrongfully treated whistleblower does not consider himself shielded
or protected by a lawsuit. At best he feels compensated, long after the
fact, for some of the losses he incurred. Consider his plight. He
suffered the fear and embarrassment of being fired and seeking new
work under disadvantageous conditions. His income stream was
abruptly shut off. To obtain any recompense from his employer, he
navigated the cumbersome, unpleasant and labyrinthian process of
American litigation - the administrative forms, the grilling by
opposing counsel, the delay, and the uncertainty of victory. This
14. The Time Magazine Persons of the Year for 2002 were "The Whistleblowers," Cynthia
Cooper of Worldcom, Coleen Rowley of the FBI and Sherron Watkings of Enron. See TIME,
Dec. 30, 2002, cover photo & 30. Examples of popular movies providing sympathetic portrayals
of whistleblowers include Silkwood (20th Century Fox, ABC Films, 1983), which grossed $35.6
million in the United States and resulted in numerous nominations and awards, and The China
Snydrome (IPC Films, 1979), which grossed $25.342 million on theatrical rentals in the USA,
and garnered many nominations and awards. See Business Data for Silkwood, at <http://us.
imdb.com/Business?0086312> (last visited Jan 11, 2003); Awards for Silkwood, at <http://us.
imdb.com/Tawards?0086312> (last visited Jan. 11, 2003); Business Data for China Snydrome, at
<http://us.imdb.com/Business?0078966> (last visited Jan. 11, 2003); Awards for China
Syndrome, at <http://us.imdb.com/Tawards?0078966> (last vi ited Jan 11, 2003).
15. See Winters v. Houston Chronicle Publ'g Co., 795 S.W.2d 723. 729 (Tx. 1990) (Doggett,
K., concurring) (listing examples of cases where employee whistleblowers could have prevented
injurious activities). This assertion is in contrast to the cases that say that private employee
health is not a matter of public policy. See infra notes 154-55 and accompanying text.
16. "The modern corporation must encourage the honest and concerned employee to blow
the whistle on illegalities and actual malpractices. It must give the whistle blower access to the
people who can change things ... to those high enough up in the corporation to solve it."
Winters, 795 S.W.2d at 728-29 (Doggett, J., concurring) (citation omitted).
17. Id. at 728 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
18. Id. at 730.
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worker who blew the whistle on a violation of law and also sued for
improper retaliation embarked on two crusades: one to correct the
violation, the other to vindicate the right of workers to speak out.
The employer has an entirely different perspective. The
employer feels a diminishment of power from even the possibility of
legal action by the employee. The employer's attorneys' fees are
even less likely to be covered than the plaintiff whistleblower's. The
employer fears significant negative publicity. The employer's agents
responsible for the reprisal worry that they themselves will suffer
negative job consequences if the employer is sued. Thus, the
supervisor's perception of the whistleblower's legal remedies may be
sufficient to deter improper action. The result is that the very
existence of statutes or common law rules may protect many
whistleblowers from future retaliation.
There are various avenues leading to compensation for the
wrongfully fired whistleblower:19  the federal OSHAct;20  state
OSHActs,2 state and federal whistleblower statutes,22 other federal
statutes,23 and common law torts.24 These avenues lead to similar if
not identical ends: the whistleblower is returned, more or less, to his
rightful position, via back pay, reinstatement (or front pay),
expungement of records, and compensatory monetary awards.
The urge to provide wide protection for the whistleblower is
reined in by a countervailing concern that the protections will be
abused or will backfire.25 If a sub-par employee, sensing that he is
19. For an overview of legal protections for whistleblowers, see Lois A. Lofgren,
Whistleblower Protection: Should Legislatures and the Courts Provide a Shelter to Public and
Private Sector Employees Who Disclose the Wrongdoing of Employers?, 38 S.D. L. REV. 316,
320-30 (1993).
20. 29 USC § 660(c) (2000).
21. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 18.60.089 (2002); ARIz. REV. STAT. § 23-425 (1999); IND.
CODE ANN. § 22-8-1.38.1 (West 1991); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 338.121(3) (Michie 2001); MD.
CODE ANN. LAB. & EMPL. § 5-604(b) (1999).
22. See generally INDIVIDUAL EMPLOY. RTS. MAN. (BNA) 505:28 (2002).
23. For an overview of the available means of recovery see Swain, supra note 11, at 59; see
also infra note 142.
24. Although a tort cause of action for discharge in violation of public policy is available in
most states, there are some notable exceptions. See Guillory v. St. Landry Parish Police Jury,
802 F.2d 822 (5th Cir. 1986); Borden v. Johnson, 395 S.E.2d 628 (Ga. Ct. App. 1990); Murphy v.
Am. Home Prods. Corp., 448 N.E.2d 86 (N.Y. 1983).
25. As one judge observed:
An investigation by an outsider will generally be disruptive and expensive to the
employer. Substantial damage is likely to result regardless of whether the allegation is
true or false. Even if the allegation is true, the disruption and expense may be
unjustifiable if the alleged wrong is not a substantial one.
The employee does not have a right to disregard these concerns. Indeed, the
common law recognizes that an employee has a duty of an undivided and unselfish
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about to be fired, could find some violation of law to reveal or to
threaten to reveal to make a supervisor hesitate before taking
deserved negative job action, whistleblower protection would become
a shield for slackers rather than a goad to truth-tellers. Another worry
is that the picky, perennial whiner, the naysaying trouble-maker,26 Will
be given too much power and will slow the progress of people of good
will.2 7 Unions may use OSHA complaints, or the threat thereof, to
pressure collective bargaining. Meddlesome whistleblowers, and the
government agencies they call in, may interfere with autonomous
management of the company.2 8 When viewed in the short run, the
external whistleblower's choice is between company loyalty and the
public good.29 Any protection of the external whistleblower rewards
what might be termed "disloyalty." When viewed at some distance,
however, what is good for the public may become to a large extent
congruent with what is good for the company. Safe, healthy
employees work better. Inefficiencies result if workers are
chronically worried about getting hurt or incessantly outraged by
clearly illegal conduct.30
The legal protections available to whistleblowers attempt to
balance all these concerns. Part II examines two leading sources of
recovery, section 11(c) of the OSHAct and the common law public
policy tort.
loyalty to the employer.
Gutierrez v. Sundancer Indian Jewelry, 868 P.2d 1266, 1283 (N.M. App. 1993)(Hartz, J.,
dissenting) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
26. See Winters v. Houston Chronicle Publ'g Co., 795 S.W.2d 723, 733 n.22 (Tx. 1990)
(Doggett, J., concurring).
27. "This is not to say that all whistleblowers should be viewed as heroes or knights in
shining armor. Some may be ill-informed, meddlesome troublemakers or ill-motivated and
vindictive." Culp, supra note 8, at 115.
28. For insight into the federal statutory whistleblowing protection from a government
manager's perspective, see Kimball, supra note 9. It has been suggested that effective, firm use
of summary judgment will protect employers' legitimate, broad discretion to run their
workplaces as they see fit. Winters, 795 S.W.2d at 732 (Doggett, J., concurring).
29. The tension in the whistleblower's choice is well caught in the title, WHISTLEBLOWING:
SUBVERSION OR CORPORATE CITIZENSHIP? (Ed Gerald Vinten, ed., 1994). The book compiles
essays, case studies and articles on English and American law pertaining to whistleblowers.
30. One commentator has noted:
[The whistleblower] did not believe in the "loyalty-to-his-company-at-all-costs"
approach to his work. His loyalty was to what he believed was a higher morality. In
seemingly being disloyal to his company, he sought to protect the rights and safety of
the public. Oddly enough, in so doing, he may have been more loyal to the long-range
viability of the company than all those corporate employees who turn their heads when
wrongdoing occurs.
Culp, supra note 8, at 115.
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II. Two AVENUES OF RECOVERY
A. OSHAct - Section 11(c)
The first enumerated purpose of the OSHAct is to "encourag[e]
employers and employees in their efforts to reduce the number of
occupational safety and health hazards at their places of
employment."3 ' In furtherance of this purpose, section 11(c) provides:
No person shall discharge or in any manner discriminate against
any employee because such employee has filed any complaint or
instituted or caused to be instituted any proceeding under or
related to this Act or has testified or is about to testify in any such
proceeding or because of the exercise by such employee on behalf
of himself or others of any right afforded by this Act.
1. Practice and Procedure3
An employee who believes he has been "in any manner
discriminate[d] against" may file a complaint with the OSHA Area
Director,34 within thirty days of the wrongful treatment.3 5 No
particular form of complaint is required,36 and the complaint may be
31. 29 U.S.C. § 651(b)(1) (2000); see also Donovan v. R.D. Anderson Constr. Co., 552 F.
Supp. 249, 251 (D. Kan. 1982) ("The primary purpose of the [OSHAct] is to assure safe and
healthful working conditions for workers.").
32. 29 U.S.C. § 660(c)(1) (2000). See 29 C.F.R. pt. 1977 (2001). For an overview of section
11(c), see Glenn A. Guarino, Annotation, Prohibition of Discrimination Against, or Discharge
of Employee Because of Exercise of Right Afforded by Occupational Safety and Health Act,
Under § 11(c)(1) of the Act (29 USCS § 660(c) (1), 66 A.L.R. FED. 650 (1984 & Supp. 2002).
33. See generally OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY & HEALTH ADMINISTRATION, WHISTLE-
BLOWERS INVESTIGATIONS MANUAL, (Dep't Of Labor Instruction Directive No. DISO-0.8,
2002), available at <http://www.osha.gov/pls/oshaweb/owadisp.show-document?P-table=DIR
ECTIVES&p-id=2771&p-textversion=FALSE> (last visited Jan. 14, 2003) [hereinafter
OSHA WHISTLEBLOWERS INVESTIGATIONS MANUAL].
34. 29 C.F.R. § 1977.15(c) (2001). Failure to file may be considered a failure to exhaust
administrative remedies, and lead to summary judgment for the employer. McCarthy v. The
Bark Peking, 676 F.2d 42, 46-47 (2d Cir. 1982), vacated on other grounds, 459 U.S. 1166 (1983).
35. The thirty-day statute of limitations is subject to waiver, estoppel and equitable tolling.
29 C.F.R. §1977.15(d) (2001); Donovan v. Hahner, Foreman & Harness, Inc., 736 F.2d 1421,
1423-28 (10th Cir. 1984). See also Donovan v. Diplomat Envelope Corp., 587 F. Supp. 1417,
1423 (E.D. N.Y. 1984) (calling "petty" an objection to a complaint that was filed orally 4 days
after the discrimination and in writing "only nine days beyond the thirty-day period," and
observing, "It is not clear that the time limitation in question creates a right in the favor of the
employer. It may well be that the time limitation is designed solely for the benefit of the
Secretary [of Labor], to protect the Secretary from the necessity of having to investigate claims
which he regards as stale."); Donovan v. Peter Zimmer Am., Inc., 557 F. Supp. 642 (D.S.C.
1982) (holding that complaints made to State Department of Labor within thirty days tolled the
running of the federal limitations period).
36. 29 C.F.R. §1977.15(b) (2001).
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filed via the internet.7
OSHA has ninety days to investigate the complaint and notify
the complaint of the result of the investigation.3 8 OSHA will usually
try to negotiate a settlement.39 OSHA attempts to satisfy the
complainant in the settlement process, but utlimately the agency has
final say over settlement.40 If no settlement can be reached, but
OSHA determines that a case has merit, the Secretary of Labor may
file suit in federal district court.4' The individual employee has no
right to file his or her own private lawsuit under the OSHAct.42
37. OSHA WHISTLEBLOWERS INVESTIGATION MANUAL, supra note 33, § IV(A), Com-
plaint Filing. The overseer of whistleblower investigations under OSHA's jurisdiction reports no
great surge in complaints regarding whistleblowing since internet complaints have been allowed.
Conversation with Tom Buckley, Director, OSHA Office of Investigative Assistance, June 15,
2000.
38. 29 U.S.C. § 660(c)(2)(3) (2002); 29 C.F.R. § 1977.16 (2001).
39. "It is OSHA policy to seek settlement of all cases determined to be meritorious prior to
referrring the case for litigation." OSHA WHISTLEBLOWERS INVESTIGATIONS MANUAL, supra
note 33, ch. 6, II.
40. "If the settlement does not contain a make whole remedy, the complainant's
concurrence must be noted in the file ..... Id. ch. 6, IV A 4 (a).
Under the OSHA 11(c), when the complainant does not agree to become a party to a
settlement which, in the Regional Administrator's opinion, is a fair and equitable
settlement of all matters at issue and would effectuate the policies of the Act,
settlement agreements may be effected between OSHA and respondents without the
consent of the complainant. All unilateral settlement agreements must be personally
reviewed and approved in writing by the Regional Administrator.
Id., ch. 6, IV. B, 3.
41. 29 C.F.R. §1977.3 (2001). However, the OSHAct contains no express limitations period
for the Secretary of Labor's lawsuit under section 11(c), and courts have refused to borrow state
statutes of limitations. Donovan v. Square D. Co., 709 F.2d 335, 337 (5th Cir. 1983); Marshall v.
Intermountain Elec. Co., Inc., 614 F.2d 260, 261-63 (10th Cir. 1980). The Secretary's action,
however, is subject to the equitable defense of laches. See Donovan v. Diplomat Envelope
Corp., 587 F. Supp. 1417, 1423 (E.D. N.Y. 1984) (finding no laches because of notice, despite
argument of detrimental reliance by the employer because a replacement employee was hired).
42. Taylor v. Brighton Corp., 616 F.2d 256, 258-64 (6th Cir. 1980). See infra text
accompanying notes 116-45. The Hazard Reporting Protection Act, H.R. 1851, 106th Cong., 1st
Sess (1999), would have increased the time for workers to file retaliation complaints from 30 to
180 days; set firm deadlines for the Department of Labor ("DOL") to complete investigation of
retaliation complaints; allow the DOL to provide for reinstatement, back pay and damages
without requiring the employee to go to court; protect refusals to work; and allow workers to
bring their own cases to an administrative law judge if the DOL decides not to pursue the case.
The bill was referred on June 4, 1997 to the House Committee on Education and the
Workforce, Subcommittee on Workforce Protections, but does not appear to have progressed
further. Then Secretary of Labor Alexis Herman observed that expanding OSHA
whistleblowers had bipartisan support, including from former Secretaries of Labor Ann
McLaughlin, Elizabeth Dole and Robert B. Reich. Labor Secretary Honors Atlanta Rescue
Heroes; Announces New Whistleblower Legislation, OSHA National News Release, USDL 99-
120 (April 28, 1999), available at <http://www.osha.gov/pls/oshaweb/owadisp.show document?
p-table=NEWS RELEASES&p-id=918&p.textversion=FALSE> (last visited Nov. 22,2002).
However, the OSHA website indicates that the news release does not represent current OSHA
policy. Id. Referred, June 4, 1999, to House Committee on Education and the Workforce,
Subcommittee on Workplace Protections.
An employee fired for exercising OSHAct rights may bring other actions concurrent
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The statute prohibits discrimination because an employee
"fil[ed] any complaint."4 3 The reference to "filing" a complaint is an
obvious reference to external whistleblowing. "Any complaint"
includes not only an official complaint to an OSHA office, but also
any request for inspection under section 8(f)." "[T]he range of
complaints 'related to' the Act is commensurate with the broad
remedial purposes of this legislation and the sweeping scope of its
application."'4 This includes complaints registered with other federal
or state agencies "which have the authority to regulate or investigate
occupational safety and health conditions." 46
The statute also prohibits discrimination because the employee
has "instituted or caused to be instituted any proceeding under or
related to [the] Act." 47 This includes employee initiation or invoca-
tion of various statutory mechanisms. Complaints to unions,49 to
with the section 11(c) case brought by the Secretary. OSHA regulations expressly allow the
employee to pursue remedies under collective bargaining agreements, and before the National
Labor Relations Board, 29 C.F. R. § 1977.18(a) (2001), and to seek help from state agencies, id.
§ 1977.23. This can lead to jurisdictional conflicts. See, e.g. Appeal of Osram Sylvania, Inc., 706
A.2d 172, 174 (N.H. 1998) (finding the State Department of Labor had jurisdiction to enforce
the state whistleblowers' protection act, despite parallel § 11(c) proceeding). The outcome of an
arbitration proceeding does not preclude a lawsuit by the Secretary under section 11(c).
Marshall v. N.S. Indus., Inc., 618 F.2d 1220, 1222 (7th Cir. 1980); Reich v. Sysco Corp, 870 F.
Supp. 777 (S.D. Ohio 1994). See Swain, supra note 11, at 91-94.
43. 29 U.S.C. 660(c)(1) (2000); 29 C.F.R. §1977.3 (2001). Actual filing of a complaint, with
OSHA or any other relevant agency, is not required, as long as the employer believes or
suspects that the employee has filed the complaint. See, e.g., Hoy Shoe Co., 32 F.3d at 364. The
complaint may be oral or in writing. Power City Elec., Inc., 1979 O.S.H. Dec. (CCH) ¶ 23,947
(E.D. Wash.1979). In a proceeding under the Minnesota OSHAct, which contains language
similar to the OSHAct, the court found that the "complaint" may include an employee's
demonstration of a dangerous practice. Bohn v. Cedarbrok Eng'g Co., 422 N.W.2d 534, 537
(Minn. Ct. App. 1988) (finding protected an employee fired for demonstrating smoke problems
to a state inspector, who took smoke samples).
44. 29 C.F.R. §1977.9(a) (2001).
45. Id.
46. Id. §1977.9(b); Donovan v. Peter Zimmer Am., Inc., 557 F. Supp. 642, 644 (D.S.C.
1982) (complaint to state OSHA); American Atomics, Inc., 1980 O.S.H. Dec. (CCH) ¶24,254
(D. Ariz. 1980); Marshall v. Commonwealth Aquarium 469 F. Supp. 690, 692 (D. Mass.)
(complaint to local health authorities), aff'd, 611 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1979); but see Usery v. Certified
Welding, 1978 O.S.H. Dec. (CCH) ¶ 22,605 (D. Wyo.) (finding complaint to state agency not
protected), aff'd sub nom. Marshall v. Certified Welding Corp., 1979 O.S.H. Dec. (CCH) 1
23,257 (10th Cir.1978). See Swain, supra note 11, at 84 n.119.
47. 29 U.S.C. 11(c) (2000).
48. 29 C.F.R. §1977.10 (2001) provides:
Discharge of, or discrimination against, any employee because the employee has
"instituted or caused to be instituted any proceeding under or related to this Act"
is also prohibited by section 11(c). Examples of proceedings which could arise
specifically under the Act would be inspections of work sites under section 8 of the
Act, employee contest of abatement date under section 10(c) of the Act, employee
initiation of proceedings for promulgation of an occupational safety and health
standard under section 6(b) of the Act and part 1911 of this chapter, employee
application for modification of revocation of a variance under section 6(d) of the
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lawyers,so or even to the local paper" are protected. Also protected is
testimony in OSHA proceedings.
Administrative regulations and case law also prohibit adverse
treatment because of internal complaints to the employer. " [T]he
salutary principles of the Act would be seriously undermined if
employees were discouraged from lodging complaints about
occupational safety and health matters with their employers. Such
complaints to employers, if made in good faith, therefore would be
related to the Act, and an employee would be protected against
discharge or discrimination caused by a complaint to the employer."
The introductory section of the OSHAct describes its purpose
"to assure so far as possible every working man and woman in the
Nation safe and healthful working conditions and to preserve our
human resources."5 4 Courts effectuate this purpose by viewing
protected activity under section 11(c) broadly." For example, one
court upheld section 11(c) protection for an employee merely
"because he was a special friend of [a complaining employee]."" In
another case, a court found a violation where three employees were
fired because the employer was unable "to pinpoint the one employee
who actually filed the OSHA complaint. [The employer] accordingly
fired all three suspected 'culprits,' notwithstanding his mistake as to
[the two who had not filed]. Such an approach brings the 'innocent'
parties under the umbrella of protected activity.""
Act and part 1905 of this chapter, employee judicial challenge to a standard under
section 6(f) of the Act and employee appeal of an Occupational Safety and Health
Review Commission order under section 11(a) of the Act. In determining whether
a "proceeding" is "related to" the Act, the considerations discussed in Sec. 1977.9
would also be applicable.
(b) An employee need not himself directly institute the proceedings. It is sufficient
if he sets into motion activities of others which result in proceedings under or
related to the Act.
Id.
49. Donovan v. Diplomat Envelope Corp., 587 F. Supp. 1417, 1419 (E.D. N.Y. 1984).
50. Dunlop v. Hanover Shoe Farms, Inc., 441 F. Supp. 385, 388 (M.D. Pa. 1976).
51. Donovan v. R.D. Andersen Contr. Co., 552 F. Supp. 249, 250 (D. Kan. 1982).
52. 29 C.F.R. §1977.11 (2001).
53. Id. §1977.9(c); see Marshall v. Springville Poultry Farm, Inc., 445, F. Supp. 2, 3 (M.D.
Pa. 1977) (upholding the regulation).
54. 29 U.S.C. § 651(b) (2000).
55. See R.D. Andersen Constr. Co., 552 F. Supp. at 253 ("The very language of the statute
[section 11(c)] suggests that a broad construction is appropriate. Further, the broad remedial
purpose of the Act mandates that an employee's communications with a newspaper reporter
regarding conditions of the workplace are protected.").
56. Reich v. Cambridgeport Air Sys., Inc., 26 F.3d 1187, 1188 (1st Cir. 1994).
57. Donovan v. Peter Zimmer Am., Inc., 557 F. Supp. 642, 652 (D.S.C. 1982).
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The complaint or proceeding need not lead to a finding of a
safety violation to qualify for the protection of section 11(c). One
court wrote:
The presence or absence of safety violations is not before the Court
in an action under §660(c)(1) of the Act. The crux of §660(c)(1)
litigation is whether the employer's actions against the employee
were predicated upon the employee's filing of a complaint or
engagement in other protected activity. Had [employer] been as
pure as the driven snow in its maintenance of the work-place, and
had it nevertheless fired complainants for urging OSHA to
investigate, the instant action would still lie, so long as the
complainants had acted (as they palpably did in this case) in good
faith."
Section 11(c) prohibits intentional discrimination. The section
should be read broadly, "'otherwise the Act would be gutted by
employer intimidation.' "5 The prohibition of the section goes to all
forms of detrimental discrimination, not only to termination.60
The gravamen of the cause of action turns on a finding of
improper motivation leading to an adverse employment action.
Although motive is difficult to prove, the burden of proof is eased
through use by courts of the McDonnell Douglas method of proof
developed under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.61 The
Secretary establishes a prima facie case under section 11(c) by
proving the employee's participation in protected activity, a
subsequent adverse employment action and evidence of a causal
connection between the two. The employer then must articulate a
non-discriminatory reason for the adverse action, after which the
Secretary has the burden to prove that the articulated reason was
pretextual.62
Mixed motive cases have arisen under section 11(c). The Act is
violated if the protected activity was a substantial reason for the
discharge, or if the discharge would not have taken place "but for"
58. Donovan v. Freeway Const. Co.. 551 F. Supp. 869, 877 (D.R.I. 1982).
59. Reich v. Hoy Shoe Co., 32 F. 3d 361, 368 (8th Cir. 1993) (quoting Marshall v. Whirlpool
Corp., 593 F.2d 715, 722 (6th Cir. 1979), aff'd, 445 U.S. 1, 23 (1980)). For a discussion of the
need for a broad interpretation of the OSHAct to "achieve accident prevention," see MARK. A.
ROTHSTEIN, OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH LAW § 125 (4th ed. 1998).
60. "An employer 'discriminates' against an employee within the meaning of [11(c)] only
when he treats that employee less favorably than he treats others similarly situated." Whirlpool
Corp. v. Marshall, 445 U.S. 1, 19 (1980). See infra text accompanying notes 64-72.
61. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-04 (1973).
62. Reich v. Hoy Shoe Co., 32 F.3d 361, 365 (8th Cir. 1994). The determination of pretext
often turns on witness credibility. See generally Reich v. Skyline Terrace, Inc. 977 F. Supp. 1141,
1147 (N.D. Okla. 1997).
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the protected activity."
The pivotal proof required in the section 11(c) lawsuit goes to
whether the employer treated the whistleblowing employee worse
than other employees because of the whistleblowing. Relevant factual
inquiries include: (1) the employer's past record of handling safety
complaints;6 4 (2) the employer's knowledge" or suspicion" of the
safety complaints; (3) the employer's knowledge that the employee
made the complaints;6 7 (4) timing of adverse employment action
closely following the protected activity;" (5) the existence of other
reasons for the employment action;6 (6) treatment of other
63. 29 CFR § 1977.6(b) (2001) ("[T]o establish a violation of section 11(c), the employee's
engagement in protected activity need not be the sole consideration behind ischarge or other
adverse action. If protected activity was a substantial reason for the action, or if the discharge
or other adverse action would not have taken place 'but for' engagement in protected activity,
section 11(c) has been violated."); Marshall v. Commonwealth Aquarium, 469 F. Supp. 690,692-
93 (D. Mass.1979) ("once the plaintiff establishes that his activity was protected and that the
protected activity was a substantial factor in the employer's decision, the burden then shifts to
the employer to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that it would have reached the
same decision in the absence of the protected conduct ... ); see also Usery v. Granite Groves,
1977-78 O.S.H. Dec. (CCH) 1 22,126 (D.D.C. 1977) (finding no liability because retaliatory
motive only a "minor" rather than "substantial" reason for discharge.) For discussion and
criticism of the allocation of proof in mixed motive cases, see ROTHSTEIN, supra note 59, at §
206.
64. Compare Marshall v. Dexter Corp., 487 F. Supp. 78, 80 (N.D. Ill. 1980) (noting that the
employer had encouraged employees to bring safety complaints to management's attention, and
the employee "came forward with no credible evidence of any employee having been criticized
or disciplined for making safety complaints") with Donovan v. Freeway Constr. Co., 551 F. Supp
869, 876 (D.R.I. 1982) (workers aiding OSHA inspectors referred to as "trouble making clique"
by employer). See also Reich v. Cambridgeport Air Sys., 26 F.3d 1187, 1188 (1st Cir. 1994)
(punitive damages were justified by "brash" behavior, including an attempt to bribe Labor
Department inspector with a case of wine).
65. Dexter, 487 F. Supp. at 80 (no credible evidence that any managers, and most
importantly no managers who made the discharge decision, were aware of her OSHA
complaints before her discharge).
66. Reich v. Hoy Shoe Co., 32 F.3d 361, 363-64 (8th Cir. 1994). See text accompanying note
57, supra.
67. Reich v. Skyline Terrace, Inc., 977 F. Supp. 1141, 1147 (N.D. Okla. 1997) (nurse
reported shortage of latex gloves to OSHA, OSHA issued a complaint, and four days later the
nurse was fired. The court inferred a "causal connection" between the OSHA report and the
firing from the brief time period between the inspection and the termination, "coupled with the
allegations in the complaint from which [plaintiff] could have been identified. . . . "); Powell v.
Globe Indus., Inc., 431 F. Supp. 1096, 1101 (N.D. Ohio 1977) (employer did not know that
plaintiff had filed OSHA complaint, so plaintiff could not establish retaliatory discharge in
violation of collective bargaining agreement).
68. Rath v. Selection Research, Inc., 978 F.2d 1087, 1090 (8th Cir. 1992); Donovan v.
Commercial Sewing, Inc., 562 F. Supp. 548, 553 (D. Conn. 1982) (employee undependable for
months, but fired the day after she complained about health implications of a glue). Timing isn't
everything, though. In one case, an employee was discharged after pointing out OSHA
violations, but the company did not know that he was the complainant. Powell v. Globe Indus.,
Inc., 431 F. Supp. 1096 (N.D. Ohio 1977).
69. See Sec'y of Labor v. Keystone Foods Corp., 1990 O.S.H. Dec. (CCH) 1 29,065 (N. D.
Ohio 1990) (finding that the employee would have been suspended for insubordination
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employees similar to the complaining employee" and (7) employer
statements.71 Often these factors are interdependent. Direct proof of
improper motive is not required; circumstantial evidence will suffice.72
Section 11(c)(2) provides for a court to award "all appropriate
relief including rehiring or reinstatement of the employee to his
former position with back pay."7 The back pay remedy is treated as
discretionary equitable relief, which means that the employer has no
right to a jury trial.74 The monetary relief awarded to a wrongfully
discharged employee has included: back pay, bonus payments,
exemplary damages, prejudgment interest and post-judgment interest.
Notably absent is recovery for emotional harm.
irrespective of OSHA activity); Marshall v. Dexter Corp., 487 F. Supp. 78, 80 (N.D. Ill. 1980)
(finding that employee was unwilling to work cooperatively with management and that she had
lied about and undermined one particular supervisor); Usery v. Granite Groves, 1977-78 O.S.H.
Dec. (CCH) 1 22,126 (D.D.C. 1977) (finding that predominant motive for discharge was
substandard job performance); but see Reich v. Cambridgeport Air Sys., Inc., 26 F.3d 1187,
1188-89 (1st Cir. 1994) (noting that despite employee's problems at work, and despite the
employee's credibility problems on the stand, the district court had found that he was fired for
being friends with a person who brought an OSHA complaint).
70. In Reich v. Hoy Shoe Co., 32 F.3d 361 (8th Cir. 1994), the employer claimed that the
employee had been disciplined pursuant to an attendance policy, but the employee was "the
first person so disciplined, even though other employees had comparable or worse attendance
records." Id. at 367. The court stated, "The only other employee ever disciplined under the
policy had a record significantly worse than [the complaining employee] and was not disciplined
until a point in time after [employer] had received notice of [the] retaliation complaint." Id. See
also Donovan v. George Lai Contracting, Ltd., 629 F. Supp. 121 (W.D. Mo. 1985); Donovan v.
Peter Zimmer Am., Inc., 557 F. Supp. 642 (D. S.C. 1982); Schult Homes Corp., 1980 O.S.H. Dec.
(CCH) ¶ 24,152 (W.D. Ky. 1979).
71. See Reich v. Cambridgeport Air Systems, 1993 O.S.H. Dec. (CCH) 1 30,242 (D. Mass
1993) (noting that the "employee testified that his foreman asked him if he had called OSHA
and when he stated that he had, the foreman responded, [y]ou're fired."), aff'd, 26 F.3d 1187,
1188 (1st Cir. 1994); Martin v. Anslinger, Inc., 794 F. Supp. 640, 644 (S.D. Tex. 1992) (finding
employer liable who told employee that he was fired because he "had talked 'too much' to the
OSHA inspector."); Donovan v. George Lai Contr., Ltd, 629 F. Supp. 121,122 (W.D. Mo.1985)
("[The employee] informed [his foreman] that he had called OSHA that morning. [The
foreman] responded, 'That will probably cost you your job.'" The employee was fired that
afternoon).
72. Schweiss v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 987 F.2d 548, 549 (8th Cir. 1993); Donovan v.
Freeway Constr. Co., 551 F. Supp. 869, 872-76 (D.R.I. 1982).
73. 29 U.S.C. § 660(c)(2) (2000).
74. Martin v. Sharpline Converting, Inc., 790 F. Supp. 252, 253 (D. Kan. 1992) (noting that
the OSHAct makes no reference to a right to a jury trial, and that the Seventh Amendment
preserves the right to trial by jury only where legal rights are at stake); see also Dunlop v.
Hanover Shoe Farms, Inc., 441 F. Supp. 385-86 (M.D. Pa. 1976). For a general discussion, see
Robert Roy, Right to Jury Trial in Action for Retaliatory Discharge from Employment, 52 ALR
4th 1141 (1987 & Supp. 2002).
75. For a good general summary of section 11(c) remedies, see Robert F. Koets,
Annotation, What Constitutes Appropriate Relief for Retaliatory Discharge under §l1(c) of
Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA) (29 USCS § 660(c); 134 A.L.R. FED. 629, 635
(1996); but see Swain, supra note 11, at 132 ("The limited remedies available under most of the
federal statutes [including OSHAct] may not be as effective as tort remedies at common law in
deterring this unsavory conduct on the part of employers.").
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Uncertainties regarding the amount of back pay should be
resolved against the discriminating employer, since its unlawful
conduct created the necessity for the award.76 Many OSHA
complaints arise at construction sites, where the work is cyclical and
seasonal, so the back pay amount is often uncertain. One court
wrote: "Resolving this uncertainty in light of the evidence, the court
finds that the highest number of hours worked by any welder during
the relevant periods is an appropriate measure of the number of
hours which [the discharged employee] would have worked .... "
One court calculated the percent of time the respective plaintiffs had
been previously absent from work, and reduced the award by that
78percent.
In Reich v. Cambridgeport Air Systems, Inc.,79 the parties
stipulated what the back pay period would be, but they did not agree
that the fired employees would have retained their jobs for the entire
period.o The employer argued that the work was cyclical, and that
the poor work history of one of the employees would have resulted in
his lay off.81 The district court awarded base pay for the entire period.
The First Circuit upheld the district court's findings, which were
81based partly on the lack of credibility of the employer's witnesses.
The duration of the back pay period normally runs from the date
76. Martin v. Anslinger, Inc., 794 F. Supp. 640, 647 (S.D. Tex. 1992); see Dole v. H.M.S.
Direct Mail Serv., Inc., 752 F. Supp. 573, 581-82 (S.D. N.Y. 1990) (awarding only $1.00 in back
pay because the employee had no pay stubs and no income tax returns to prove his earnings
before discharge), rev'd, 936 F.2d 108 (2d Cir. 1991) (allowing back pay because the employee
could prove the amount of his unemployment benefits, which were exactly half of the earnings
the employee would have received from the employer during that time).
77. Anslinger, 794 F. Supp. at 648. In that case the questions were whether the employee
would have been working at all, and what he would have been paid. Id. The employer presented
no evidence "suggesting what criteria (i.e. seniority) were used by the company to determine
which welders would be retained during a layoff and which would not." Id. See also Donovan v.
George Lai Contracting, Ltd., 629 F. Supp. 121, 123 (W.D. Mo. 1985).
78. Marshall. v. Wallace Bros. Mfg. Co., 1978 WL 186390 at *405 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 22, 1978).
79. 26 F.3d 1187 (1st Cir. 1994).
80. See id. at 1189.
81. Id.
82. Id. A court within the Fifth Circuit has articulated a clear and convincing standard by
which the employer must rebut the employee's proof. See Martin v. Anslinger, Inc., 794 F.
Supp. 640, 647 (S.D. Tex. 1992) ("a court's finding of discrimination presumptively entitles [the
discharged employee] to back pay unless the defendants can prove by clear and convincing
evidence that [the employee] would not have stayed in his job absent he discrimination."). This
stems from the Fifth Circuit's employment discrimination opinion in Baxter v. Savannah Sugar
Refining Corp., 495 F.2d 437, 444-45 (5th Cir. 1974). Baxter has been followed by other circuits
in discrimination cases, even though it has been called into question in its own circuit. Compare
O'Day v. McDonnell Douglas Helicopter Co. 79 F.3d 756 (9th Cir., 1996)(Fletcher, J.,
dissenting) with Mooney v. Aramco Serv. Co., 54 F.3d 1207 (5th Cir. 1995).
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of discharge to the date of reemployment, or other relevant date.83
The employee, however, has an obligation to avoid the consequences
of the wrongful firing.4 The burden is on the employer to prove that
the employee failed to mitigate damages by finding interim
employment." The employer must prove that a "similar employment
opportunity was available in the specific line of work in which the
employee was engaged."86  "Ordinarily, an employee's unreasonable
rejection of a bona fide offer of reinstatement will stop an employer's
back pay liability from continuing to accrue."" Any amounts actually
earned during the back pay period are deducted from the back pay
award. Back pay awards, however, are not reduced for state
unemployment monies collected by the employees,89 because they are
collateral benefits.90
The employee is also entitled to promised bonus payments.91 The
Secretary has the burden to prove that bonus payments were agreed
to by the employer.9 2
83. See Marshall v. Commonwealth Aquarium, 469 F. Supp. 690, 693 (D. Mass. 1979)
(period of unemployment), Donovan v. Freeway Const. Co., 551 F. Supp. 869, 880 (D.R.I. 1982)
(from date of termination until date job ended); Donovan v. Peter Zimmer Am., Inc., 557 F.
Supp. 642, 648-49, 653-54 (D.S.C. 1982) (from date of termination until date of new permanent
employment). See also MANUAL OF MODEL CIVIL JURY INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE DISTRICT
COURTS OF THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT § 5.54 (2001 ed.) (date of termination to date of verdict). It is
instructive to view the Sample Backpay Calculation Sheet, following OSHA WHISTLEBLOWER
INVESTIGATIONS MANUAL, supra note 33.
84. Donovan v. Commercial Sewing, Inc., 562 F. Supp. 548, 556 (D. Conn. 1982).
85. Donovan v. Peter Zimmer Am., Inc., 557 F.Supp. 642, 653 (D.S.C. 1982).
86. Id. at 653-54.
87. Commercial Sewing, Inc., 562 F. Supp. at 554. In the same year Commercial Sewing was
decided, the Supreme Court decided Ford Motor Co. v. E.E.O.C., 458 U.S. 219 (1982), which
held that an employer could toll the continuing accrual of backpay liability under § 706(g) of
Title VII by unconditionally offering the claimant the job previously denied. The employer was
not required to offer seniority retroactive to the date of the alleged discrimination. Thus, held
the Court, absent special circumstances the rejection of an employer's unconditional job offer
ends the accrual of potential back pay liability. Id. at 238-39. The employee in Commercial
Sewing was offered a full time position when she had previously worked part time. The court
held that this was not a good faith offer and did not toll the running of back pay. 562 F. Supp. at
555-56.
88. Martin v. Anslinger, Inc., 794 F. Supp. 640, 648 (S.D. Tex. 1992).
89. Donovan v. Peter Zimmer Am., 557 F. Supp. 642, 653. (D.S.C. 1982).
90. Anslinger, 794 F. Supp. at 649, n.14; Donovan v. George Lai Contracting, Ltd., 629 F.
Supp. 121, 123 (W.D. Mo. 1985); Donovan v. Diplomat Envelope Corp., 587 F. Supp. 1417,1425
(E.D. N.Y. 1984) ("We see no reason why defendants should profit at the expense of the State
of New York or the union's annuity fund; rather, the Court should direct that a portion of the
damages otherwise payable to [employee] should be payed to the State and the union annuity
fund.").
91. See Donovan v. Freeway Constr. Co., 551 F. Supp. 869, 880 (D. R.I. 1982).
92. Id. (finding that the Secretary had not met its burden to prove the "claimed parole
contract").
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An award of prejudgment interest on the back pay amount is
standard,93 although at the discretion of the trial court.9 4 "Pre-
judgment interest is intended to compensate a party for the time
value of money lost due to the wrongful dismissal."9 5
In Reich v. Cambridgeport Air Systems, Inc.96 the First Circuit
held that the statutory language authorizing a court to "order all
appropriate relief "included the power to award exemplary
damages.' The court analogized to environmental statutes, to tort
law in general and to the common law tort of retaliatory discharge in
particular.98 The court observed that an early Senate version of the
OSHAct fueled the employer's "strongest argument for ... deciding
that punitive damages are not available" under section 11(c).9 That
early version provided for the Secretary to order "such affirmative
action" as necessary to abate the violation.o Such language was
comparable to that used in Title VII and the National Labor
Relations Act, both of which had been interpreted not to
contemplate punitive damage awards.10' Nevertheless, as the
Cambridgeport court pointed out, the language contemplated early
on by the Senate was not adopted, and the language that was chosen
could reasonably be interpreted to include exemplary damages.102
In Cambridgeport the district court, for unclear reasons, had
doubled the back pay award. The doubling was not labeled as a
penalty, but as compensation "for the effects of loss of pay upon the
victim[s]." 03 In particular the district court had stated that "a portion
of the award covered prejudgment interest."104 But, the district court
had also "concluded that the defendant's conduct, 'both in and out of
court, [was] consistently brash,' suggesting a belief that exemplary
93. "Prejudgement interest ordinarily is awarded whenever it is necessary to fully
compensate the wrongfully injured party." Donovan v. George Lai Contracting, Ltd., 629 F.
Supp. 121, 123 (W.D. Mo. 1985).
94. Donovan v. Freeway Constr. Co., 551 F. Supp. 869, 880-81 (D.R.I. 1982).
95. Id. at 881. Federal common law provides for prejudgment interest when the amount is
reasonably ascertainable.
96. 26 F.3d 1187 (1st Cir. 1994).
97. Id. at 1191.
98. Id. at 1191-92.
99. Id. at 1192.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 1192-93.
102. Cambridgeport Air Sys., 26 F.3d at 1193.
103. Id. at 1190 (emphasis in original).
104. Id. at 1195.
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damages were in order.""o' Thus, the doubled back pay award could
have been deemed compensatory or punitive, but was, in any event,
upheld.& A more recent case criticized the vague language of
Cambridgeport concerning the basis for doubling the damages, but
agreed with the holding that "punitive damages are available under
appropriate circumstances. "07
Apart from monetary relief, courts may issue orders of reinstate-
ment,'" expungement of record(s),'9 and orders to refrain from
hindering the discharged employee from obtaining a new job.10
Reinstatement may be ordered even if the employer has already hired
a substitute employee, and even if reinstatement will require payment
of two employees for the same job or dismissal of the substitute."' In
addition to back pay, the reinstatement order may include
accumulated seniority and expungement of employee records.'12
More general injunctive relief has included enjoining an
employer from future violations of the OSHAct and posting notices
informing employees of the case at bar and of their rights under the
105. Id. The Labor Department investigator testified that an agent of the employer had
offered him a case of wine, "possibly in an attempt to influence the investigation." At trial, the
employer "revealed itself as a 'tough outfit' that 'more than passively observed; it supervised its
witnesses.'" Id.
106. Id.
107. Reich v. Skyline Terrace, Inc., 977 F. Supp. 1141,1147 (N.D. Olka. 1997).
108. 29 U.S.C. § 660(c )(2) (2000). See Donovan v. Peter Zimmer of Am., Inc., 557 F. Supp.
642, 654 (D.S.C. 1982) ("Since none of the affected employees wishes to be reinstated, no order
in that respect is required to make them whole.").
109. Donovan v. Commercial Sewing, Inc., 562 F. Supp. 548, 556 (D.Conn. 1982).
110. See, e.g., Martin v. Anslinger, Inc., 794 F. Supp. 640, 649 (S.D. Tex. 1992) ("In this case,
the court concludes that it is appropriate to enjoin defendant Urban Anslinger from providing
negative references upon inquiries about Selso Rodrigues by prospective employers.");
Donovan v. Commercial Sewing, Inc., 562 F. Supp. 548, 556 (D.Conn. 1982) ("The defendant
and its agents, Samuel and Michael Mazzarelli, are also enjoined from making any attempts to
hinder Nancy Perez from finding another job.").
111. Cf Donovan v. Diplomat Envelope Corp., 587 F.Supp. 1417, 1423 (E.D.N.Y 1984)
(rejecting employer's laches argument even though the employer had hired a substitute to
replace the discharged employee and if the employee was reinstated the employer would have
"to pay two employees for the same job or fire the substitute employee").
112. See Marshall v. Wallace Bros. Mfr. Co., 1979 O.S.H. Dec. (CCH) 123,251 at 28,126
(M.D. Pa. 1978). One writer is critical of OSHA reinstatement provisions, which are not
expedited as is reinstatement under the Mine Safety and Health Act (MSHA), 30 U.S.C. §
815(c)(2) (2000). He writes:
Due to the political compromises that are necessary to enact sweeping whistleblower
protections, such as OSHA and the state statutes, it appears that broad substantive
protections have been achieved only by sacrificing strong remedies. The example of
MSHA, however, suggests that both liberal protections and strong remedies can be
combined in whistleblower protection statues that are narrowly framed to address the
specific problems of particular industries.
DANIEL P. WESTMAN, WHISTLEBLOWING, THE LAW OF RETALIATORY DISCHARGE 75 (1991).
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Act."3 Courts can draft their own notices to be posted.114 Injunctive
relief can issue even if the employer is no longer in business."'
2. No Private Right of Action - Taylor
In Taylor v. Brighton Corp.,"' three employees complained to
the Secretary of Labor that they had been discharged in violation of
section 11(c). The Secretary notified two of the employees that he
would not file suit based on their complaints.H7 All three employees
then filed suit themselves against their employer, alleging that their
discharges violated section 11(c)."8
The Taylor court looked to the Supreme Court's decision in Cort
v. Ash19 for the factors relevant to determining whether a private
remedy is implicit in a statute not expressly providing one. First, is
the plaintiff "one of the class for whose especial benefit the statute
was enacted?'"1 20 Second, is there any indication of legislative intent,
explicit or implicit, in favor of or against a private remedy?12 ' Third,
"is it consistent with the underlying purposes of the legislative scheme
to imply such a remedy for the plaintiff?"1 22 Fourth, "is the cause of
action traditionally relegated to state law, in an area basically the
concern of the States, so that it would be inappropriate to infer a
cause of action based solely on federal law? "1 23  These factors are
"signposts that guide the court's larger inquiry: Did Congress intend
to create a private right of action in this situation? "124
The Taylor court quickly answered the first question, finding that
the plaintiff employees were members of the class of persons
113. See Donovan v. Freeway Constr. Co., 551 F. Supp. 869, 879 (D.R.I. 1982).
114. See, e.g., id. at 881-82.
115. Generally, successor corporations are liable for section 11(c) violations. See Dole v.
H.M.S. Direct Mail Serv., Inc., 752 F. Supp. 573, 580-81 (W.D.N.Y. 1990), rev'd on other
grounds, 936 F.2d 108 (2d Cir. 1991).
116. 616 F.2d 256 (6th Cir. 1980); see also King v. Fox Grocery Co., 642 F. Supp. 288,290-91
(S.D. Pa. 1986).
117. Taylor, 616 F.2d at 257. The Secretary eventually filed suit on behalf of the third
employee on the ground that his dismissal violated section 11(c). Id.
118. The employees also made allegations of racial discrimination in violation of Title VII
and 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3). Id. at 258 n.4. The Title VII action was allowed to proceed. Id. at 264-
65. The § 1985(3) causes of action were dismissed for failure to show "that the alleged
discrimination was based on their membership in a definable class." Id. at 266.
119. 422 U.S. 66 (1975). See text accompanying note 145, infra.
120. Taylor, 616 F.2d at 258 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
121. Id. (citation omitted).
122. Id. (citations omitted).
123. Id. (citations omitted).
124. Id. at 259.
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intended to benefit from section 11(c). 1 25  The court then gave an
answer to the final question that was largely accurate in 1980, when
Taylor was decided, but which is inaccurate today. The court wrote,
"Nor is there any argument that retaliatory discharge actions have
traditionally been relegated to state law; the cause of action, if one
exists, is solely federal."12 6 In only a few years that would change, as
wrongful discharge causes of actions proliferated in state courts in the
early 1980s.
The Taylor court then set about answering questions two and
three to determine the intent of Congress.127  The panel began with
the language of the statute itself, and noted the failure to mention
private suits to enforce section 11(c) and the explicit detailed
procedure set forth by Congress for the Secretary to redress section
11(c) violations.128 The court looked at the legislative history, in
particular various Senate and House versions of the prohibitions on
retaliation.'2 9 The court noted that both the Senate and the House
originally feared that physical violence would be used to oppose
enforcement of the Act. 30 The Taylor court detailed the lengthy
drafting process,"' opined that Congress intended for the Secretary to
screen out frivolous retaliation complaints,132 and concluded:
[It is] unlikely that Congress, having deliberately interposed the
Secretary's investigation as a screening mechanism between
complaining employees and the district courts, intended to permit
125. Id. at 258.
126. Id.
127. Taylor, 616 F.2d at 259-64.
128. Id. at 259.
129. Id. at 260-62.
130. Id. The original bill contained the following grim provision:
Any person who forcibly assaults, resists, opposes, impedes, intimidates, or interferes
with any person while engaged in or on account of the performance of inspections or
investigative duties under this Act shall be fined not more than $5000 or imprisoned
not more than three years, or both. Whoever, in the commission of any such acts, uses
a deadly or dangerous weapon, shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not
more than ten years, or both. Whoever kills any person while engaged in or on
account of the performance of inspecting or investigating duties under this Act shall be
punished by imprisonment for any term of years or for life.
Id. at 259-60, (quoting S. 2193, 91st Cong., 2d Sess § 9(e) (introduced in the Senate May 16,
1970), reprinted in Subcommittee on Labor, the Senate Committee on Labor and Public
Welfare, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., Legislative History of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of
1970 (Comm. Print 1971)). Thus, the drafters contemplated setting maximum fines and prison
terms for assault, battery, murder and other crimes normally in the province of the states.
131. Id. at 260-62. The rights of employees to a public hearing on retaliation diminished as
the legislative process wore on.
132. See id. at 261-62. The court explained," A more plausible explanation for the change,
we think, is that the Senate wanted the Secretary to screen out frivolous complaints so as to not
overburden the hearing body." Id. at 261.
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those employees whose claims are screened out to file individual
actions in those same courts. A private cause of action is simply
inconsistent with the enforcement plan provided by Congress.133
In Taylor, the Secretary of Labor filed an amicus brief urging the
court to find an implied private right of action.13 4 "The Secretary says
he has neither the resources nor the personnel to handle all § 11(c)
complaints adequately." 13 The Secretary argued that "individual suits
offer the only realistic hope of protecting employees from retaliatory
discrimination.""' The court replied that "[t]he Secretary should
address his arguments to Congress, not the courts."3
Five years later Taylor was relied upon by another circuit court
in George v. Aztec Rental Center, Inc.' In that procedurally irregular
case, 139 the Fifth Circuit noted Taylor's "thorough" consideration of
the matter, and squarely held that no private right of action exists
under section 11(c).1 ( The Fifth Circuit opined that "it is an
elemental canon of statutory construction that where a statute
expressly provides a particular remedy or remedies, a court must be
chary of reading others into it."141
The lack of a private right of action significantly impacts the
protection of section 11(c) whistleblowers. OSHA currently has
jurisdiction to protect whistleblowers under eleven health and safety
statutes, along with enforcing all the other provisions of these laws as
well.'42 The workload is tremendous. For example, in 1998 OSHA
133. Id. at 262-63.
134. Id. at 263.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 262-3.
137. Id. at 263.
138. 763 F.2d 184 (5th Cir. 1985).
139. The pro se employee plaintiff had failed to respond in normal time and in normal
fashion to the employer/defendant's motion for summary judgment. Id. at 185-86.
140. Id. at 186. George also lists other cases which noted in passing that no private right of
action exists, Donovan v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm'n, 713 F.2d 918, 926 (2d
Cir. 1983); Donovan v. Oil, Chem. and Atomic Workers Int'l Union, 718 F.2d 1341, 1348 n.27
(5th Cir. 1983); Donovan v. Square D. Co., 709 F.2d 335, 338-39 (5th Cir. 1983). See also Shaw v.
Western Sugar Co., 497 N.W.2d 686, 688-89 (Neb. Ct. App. 1992) (upholding dismissal of what
was apparently a suit under section 11(c); the claim was dismissed upon a motion for a directed
verdict at the close of plaintiffs presentation of the case to a jury.)
141. 763 F.2d at 187 (quoting Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc., v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11
(1979)). Because no federal private right of action is available under section 11(c), a state
common law claim of retaliatory discharge or breach of contract is not removable to federal
court, even if it pertains to an OSHA violation. There is no federal private cause of action in
this area. Pitchford v. Aladdin Steel, Inc., 828 F. Supp. 610, 613-14 (S.D. Ill. 1993).
142. Section 31105 of the Surface Transportation Assistance Act, 49 U.S.C. § 2305 (2000);
section 211 of the Asbestos Hazard Emergency Response Act, 15 U.S.C. § 265 (2000); section 7
of the International Safe Container Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1506 (2000); section 211 of the Energy
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received 2,465 whistleblower complaints under OSHAct section 11(c)
alone. Of these, only 348 were settled with the employee receiving
some remedy.143 Perhaps, in the bureaucratic shuffle, some
meritorious claims were overlooked. Perhaps, fewer would have
been overlooked by a private lawyer with more time, more interest in
the individual whistleblower, and more self-interest in pursuing the
claim. Almost certainly more retaliatory discharge lawsuits would be
filed if a private right of action were allowed. But Cort v. Ash,44 on
which Taylor rests, has been largely discarded in favor of an approach
that is even more restrictive, whereby courts will create private rights
of action only if there is affirmative evidence of congressional intent
to create one.145  Such a change only solidifies the Taylor court's
conclusion that no private right of action arises under section 11(c).
B. State Tort Cause of Action
Until the 1980s it could be said accurately that, in the eyes of the
law, the default employment relationship was "at the will" of either
party, meaning that absent a contractual term to the contrary, either
the employer or the employee could terminate the relationship at any
time for any reason.146 In the 1980s, many states developed a cause of
Reorganization Act, 42 U.S.C. § 5851 (2000); section 322 of the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7622
(2000); section 110 of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and
Liability Act, 42 U.S.C. § 9610 (2000); section 507 of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act,
33 U.S.C. § 1367 (2000); section 1450 of the Safe Drinking Water Act, 42 U.S.C. § 300-J9 (2000);
section 7001 of the Solid Waste Disposal Act, 29 U.S.C. § 6971 (2000); section 23 of the Toxic
Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2622(a) (2000); section 519 of the Wendell H. Ford
Aviation Investment and Reform Act for the 21st Century (AIR21), Pub. L. No 106-81, 114
Stat. 61, 145 (2000), codified at 49 U.S.C.A. § 42121 (Supp. 2002).
143. Of the 2,465 section 11(c) complaints received, 865 were dismissed as lacking merit; 377
were not accepted because the employee failed to file a complaint within 30 days or was not
engaged in an activity protected under the law; 39 were referred to other more appropriate
agencies such as the Mine Safety and Health Administration or the National Labor Relations
Board; 197 were withdrawn by the complainant without resolution following a closing
conference; and 42 were referred to the Solicitor of Labor for recommended litigation in court.
See Labor Secretary Honors Atlanta Rescue Heroes; Announces New Whistleblower
Legislation, OSHA National News Release, USDL 99-120 (April 28, 1999), available at <http://
www.osha.gov/pls/oshaweb/owadisp.show-document?p-table=NEWS-RELEASES&p-id=918
&p.text_version=FALSE> (last visited Nov. 22, 2002). However, the OSHA website indicates
that the news release does not represent current OSHA policy. Id.
144. 422 U.S. 66 (1975).
145. See Thompson v. Thompson, 484 U.S. 174, 179 (1988) (Scalia, J. concurring);
Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11 (1979); Touche Ross & Co. v.
Redington, 442 U.S. 560 (1979).
146. New Jersey courts have written colorfully that an at will employee may be fired "for no
specific reason or simply [for] bothering the boss." Beck v. Tribert, 711 A.2d 951 (N.J. Super.
App. Div. 1998) (quoting Velantzas v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., Inc., 356 A.2d 237 (N.J. 1988)).
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action to protect employees terminated in violation of public policy. 147
This cause of action sounds in tort in nearly all jurisdictions.148
Nonetheless, even now, nearly all courts still assert he viability of the
at will doctrine.149
The cause of action varies somewhat by jurisdiction, but it always
involves a termination of employment, and a causal-motivational ink
between a violation of public policy and the discharge. The New
Mexico Court of Appeals recently summarized the elements of the
prima facie case:
1) that the employee was discharged because he performed an act
that public policy has authorized or encouraged, or that the
employee has refused to do something that public policy condemns;
2) that the employer knew or suspected that the employee's action
involved a protected activity; 3) that there was a causal connection
between the employee's protected actions and the employer's act of
discharging him; and 4) that the employee suffered damages
thereby.5
147. "The purpose of the public policy exception in these instances is to ensure that in order
to keep his or her job, an employee is not required to forsake an important public duty (such as
whistle-blowing) or to forgo a job-related right or privilege." Coors Brewing Co. v. Floyd, 978
P.2d 663, 667 (Colo. 1999). A corollary impetus for the exception stems from a desire to enforce
the law, usually statutory law. Attorney James Hubble points out that this makes the retaliatory
discharge claim different from other limitations on the at will rule. "Unlike legislative
restrictions on the at will rule and the implied contract theories now recognized by most courts,
the retaliatory discharge exception is not based on policies specific to employment
relationships." James W. Hubble, Retaliatory Discharge and the Economics of Deterrence, 60
COLO. L.REV. 91, 96 (1989).
148. In a few jurisdictions this cause of action sounds in contract. See, e.g., Sterling Drug,
Inc. v. Oxford, 743 S.W.2d 380, 385 (Ark. 1988); Brockmeyer v. Dun & Bradstreet, 335 N.W.2d
834, 841 (Wisc. 1983). Some scholars have argued that contract is more suitable than tort for
such claims. See, e.g., Clark W. Sabey, Scalpels and Meat Cleavers: Carving a Public Policy
Limitation to the At-Will Employment Doctrine, 1993 UTAH L.REV. 597.
149. See, e.g., Shawcross v. Pyro Prods., Inc., 916 S.W.2d 342, 343 (Mo. Ct. App. 1995)
("[T]his court, while recognizing that employers may terminate employees at-will 'for no reason,
or for an arbitrary or irrational reason,' has specifically determined that there is no right to
discharge an employee for an unlawful reason or purpose which goes against public policy, and
has recognized the public policy exception to employment at-will."); Winters v. Houston
Chronicle Publ'g Co., 795 S.W. 2d 723, 733 (Tex. 1990) (Doggett, J. concurring) ("Employers
remain free under present Texas law to terminate employment relationships for no reason, or
for cause, but not for a very limited class of unconscionable reasons, as determined by judicial
decision and statute.").
150. Weilder v. Big J. Enters., Inc., 953 P.2d 1089, 1096-97 (N.M. Ct. App. 1997). Similarly,
the Colorado Supreme Court has described the prima facie case as follows:
An at-will employee, therefore, will establish a prima facie case for wrongful discharge
under the public-policy exception if the employee presents evidence on the following
elements: that the employer directed the employee to perform an illegal act as part of
the employee's work related duties or prohibited the employee from performing a
public duty or exercising an important job-related right or privilege; that the action
directed by the employer would violate a specific statute relating to the public health,
safety, or welfare, or would undermine a clearly expressed public policy relating to the
employee's basic responsibility as a citizen or the employee's right or privilege as a
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The first element is the hardest to pin down. What does public
policy encourage? What does it condemn? Courts have varied in
their formulations of what constitutes public policy. Some seem
comfortable with highly amorphous standards for the tort,"' while
others seek to impose some limits by requiring that the firing be in
violation of an important public policy evidenced by a legislative
writing.5 2 States differ on whether the writing must be from their own
legislatures, or whether federal statutes may also be a source of the
public policy.'
Because the policy allegedly violated by the discharge must be
public, matters involving only the employee's workplace, the em-
ployer's company, the employee's health, or even a group of
employees' health may be merely private and not deserving of tort
pro- tection.'54 Many cases require some sort of third party effects, or
worker; and that the employee was terminated as the result of refusing to perform the
act directed by the employer. To these elements we add the additional requirement
that the employee present evidence showing that the employer was aware, or
reasonably should have been aware, that the employee's refusal to comply with the
employer's order or directive was based on the employee's reasonable belief that the
action ordered by the employer was illegal, contrary to clearly expressed statutory
policy relating to the employee's duty as a citizen, or violative of the employee's legal
right or privilege as a worker.
Martin Marietta Corp. v. Lorenz, 823 P.2d 100, 109 (Colo. 1992). In whistleblowing cases,
Kansas requires proof that the whistleblowing was done out of a good faith concern over the
wrongful activity rather than from a corrupt motive such as malice, spite, jealousy or personal
gain. Palmer v. Brown, 752 P.2d 685, 690 (Kan 1988).
151. See Petermann v. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, Local 396, 344 P.2d 25 (Cal. App. 1959)
("whatever contravenes good morals or any established interests of society is against public
policy"); Palmateer v. Int'l Harvester Co., 421 N.E.2d 876, 878 (Ill. 1981) ("what is right and just
and what affects the citizens of the State collectively"); Payne v. Rozendaal, 520 A.2d 586, 589
(Vt. 1986) ("society's concern for providing equity and justice"). See also Jackson v. Minidoka
Irrigation. Dist., 563 P.2d 54 (Idaho 1977); Jones v. Keogh, 409 A.2d 581 (Vt. 1979).
152. See, e.g., Sterling Drug, Inc. v. Oxford, 743 S.W.2d 380, 381 (Ark. 1988) ("It is generally
recognized that the public policy of a state is found in its constitution and statutes."); Carl v.
Children's Hosp., 702 A.2d 159, 163 (D.C. App. 2000) (Terry, J., concurring) (opining that
"courts should generally abstain from making declarations of public policy" and should base the
tort on a statute, regulation or constitutional provision). See also Brockmeyer v. Dun &
Bradstreet, 335 N.W.2d 834, 839-41 (Wis. 1983) and cases cited therein.
153. Compare Kulch v. Structural Fibers, Inc., 677 N.E.2d 308, 322 (Ohio 1997) (rejecting
any distinction between state and federal sources of policy) with Griffin v. Mullinix, 947 P.2d
177, 179-80 (Okla. 1997) and McLaughlin v. Gastrointestinal Specialists, Inc., 750 A.2d 283 (Pa.
2000) (each refusing to allow federal OSHAct to serve as a source of state public policy for the
purposes of the tort).
154. In McLaughlin v. Gastrointestinal Specialists, Inc., 750 A.2d 283, 289 n.11 (Pa. 2000),
the court found that the presence of a toxic chemical in air at work was not a public concern. In
that internal whistleblower case, the court did not address the likelihood that customers could
have inhaled the toxic air. The court stressed that people outside the workplace need to be at
risk of harm for the tort to apply. See also Crawford Rehab. Serv., Inc. v. Weissman, 938 P.2d
540, 551-53 (Colo. 1997) (finding no claim for wrongful discharge allegedly in retaliation for
employee's asserting a right to rest breaks and for employee's inquiry to state Division of Labor
concerning entitlement to rest breaks because of insufficient import to the public). For a
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threat to the general public."'
Judicially drafted definitions notwithstanding, some have sug-
gested that the better way to predict outcomes in public policy tort
cases is to look at the typology of the cases, or at least to come to
156recognize what facts are likely to give rise to the cause of action.
These recognizable fact patterns have their origins in some of the
early cases creating the tort, arising from, for instance, a firing for
refusal to step down from jury duty'. or a firing for reporting
concerns about bad carrots being sold to the public.'
Occupational safety and health complaints are grounded in
federal statute and often in parallel state statutes. A finding of a
statutory violation on the part of the employer may not be necessary,
if the employee has a good faith belief that a statutory violation is at
issue.159 But the public policy allegation must be that a specific OSHA
standard or state law was violated, not merely general laxity
regarding occupational safety.'60
States are deeply split on whether internal as well as external
whistleblowers should be protected. Some states limit their public
policy tort to the external whistleblower.16 ' A number are willing to
thoughtful justification of the public/private distinction on legal, practical, and moral grounds,
see Hubble, supra note 147, at 97.
155. See, e.g. Palmateer, 421 N.E.2d at 878-79 ("a matter must strike at the heart of a
citizen's social rights, duties, and responsibilities before the tort will be allowed."); see generally
Stewart J. Schwab, Wrongful Discharge Law and the Search for Third-Party Effects, 74 TEx. L.
REV. 1943 (1996).
156. See, e.g. Shawcross v. Pyro Prods., Inc., 916 S.W.2d 342, 343 (Mo. Ct. App. 1995) ("The
courts of this state have recognized four categories of cases under the public policy exception:
(1) discharge of an employee because of his or her refusal to perform an illegal act; (2) discharge
because an employee reported violations of law or public policy to superiors or public
authorities; (3) discharge because an employee participated in acts that public policy would
encourage, such as jury duty, seeking public office, asserting a right to collective bargaining, or
joining a union; and (4) discharge because an employee filed a workers's compensation claim.");
STEVEN L. WILLBORN ET AL., EMPLOYMENT LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 128 (2d ed. 1998);
Schwab, supra note 155, at 1954. This is also recognized by the courts.
157. Nees v. Hocks, 536 P.2d 512 (Or. 1975).
158. Sheets v. Teddy's Frosted Foods, Inc., 427 A.2d 385 (Conn. 1980).
159. See Motarie v. N. Mont. Jt. Refuse Disposal Dist., 907 P.2d 154, 156-57 (Mont. 1995)
(decided under the Montana Wrongful Discharge from Employment Act, MONT. CODE ANN. §
39-2-904(1)). See also Allum v. Valley Bank of Nev., 970 P.2d 1062, 1067 (Nev. 1998) (loan
underwriting requirements); McQuary v. Bel Air Convalescent Home, Inc., 684 P.2d 21, 23-24
(Ore. App. 1984) (nursing home abuse); Ellis v. City of Seattle, 13 P.3d 1065, 1071 (Wash. 2000)
(fire precautions at sports arena); Schwab, supra note 155, at 1965.
160. Corbin v. Sinclair Mktg., Inc., 684 P.2d 265 (Colo. Ct. App. 1984).
161. See, e.g., McLaughlin v. Gastrointestinal Specialists, Inc., 750 A.2d 283 (Pa. 2000). At
least one jurisdiction provides statutory protection to internal and external whistleblowers, but
allows only external whistleblowers to pursue a common law remedy for the public policy tort.
Beck v. Tribert, 711 A.2d 951, 957-58 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1998). It is ironic that the
external whistleblower is often quicker to get protection, for he is the more disloyal employee.
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expand coverage to the internal reporter as well.162  A related
distinction is between the actual whistleblower and the would-be
whistleblower. The would-be whistleblower is someone who threatens
to blow the whistle, or implies that he is going to blow the whistle.163
Internal whistleblowers are often in this last category, because they
warn people inside the company that they are considering contacting
outside authorities. Strong arguments exist for the protection of those
who stop short of notifying external agencies. They are more loyal
than external whistleblowers, and may be more concerned with
correcting the violations of law than with getting the employer in
trouble.6
McLaughlin v. Gastrointestinal Specialists, Inc.16 ' reveals many
reasons why a court may hesitate to protect a whistleblower. Plaintiff
believed that her employer's storage and use of a chemical, in
violation of OSHA's ventilation requirements, was causing her
headaches, nausea, fatigue, shortness of breach and dizziness.166
Although she had gone to a laboratory to determine that the air was
in fact contaminated, and despite the closeness in timing between her
firing and her expressions of concern to the employer, the state court
refused to find a violation of public policy based on a violation of
For arguments that external whistleblowers ought to have a higher burden to meet, and ought to
have to prove that they worked through internal channels first, see Culp, supra note 8, at 133.
For a contrary view, see Susan Sauter, The Employee Health and Safety Whistleblower
Protection Act and the Conscientious Employee: The Potentialfor Federal Statutory Enforcement
of the Public Policy Exception to Employment at Will, 59 U. CIN. L. REV. 513, 540-41 (1990); see
also Terry Morehead Dworkin & Janet P. Near, Whistleblowing Statutes: Are they Working?, 25
AM. Bus. L.J. 241, 243 (1987).
162. See, e.g., Lanning v. Morris Mobile Melas, Inc., 720 N.E.2d 1128, 1130 (Ill. App.
Ct. 1999) ("Reports to internal personnel do not transform public issues into private disputes....
In many instances, complaints to internal personnel and supervisors may be the first step in an
investigation."); Porter v. Reardon Mach. Co., 962 S.W.2d 932, 937-38 (Mo. App. 1998); see also
Holmes v. Gen. Dynamics, 22 Cal. Rptr. 2d 172, 181 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993) (holding an internal
complaint of alleged over-billing protected under the common law tort).
163. See Sherman v. Kraft Gen. Foods, Inc., 651 N.E.2d 708, 711 (Ill. App. 1995) ("[I]t
would be an absurd result to deny a plaintiff's cause of action for retaliatory discharge where the
employer discovers the employee's intent to report an occupational hazard and terminates him
before he does so."). Accord McQuary v. Bel Air Convalescent Home, Inc., 684 P.2d 21 (Or.
Ct. App. 1984) (holding actionable discharge for threatening to report patient abuse to state
authorities).
164. Some observers have suggested that a common law duty of loyalty requires that an
employee not blow the whistle, and not be allowed a cause of action for retaliatory discharge,
unless he has made "reasonable efforts to correct the problem through efforts within the
company." Gutierrez v. Sundancer Indian Jewelry, 868 P.2d 1266, 1282 (N.M. Ct. App. 1993)
(Hartz, J., dissenting) (citing Martin H. Malin, Protecting the Whistleblower from Retaliatory
Discharge, 16 U. MICH. J. L. REF. 277, 307-14 (1983)). If so, it would be perverse not to protect
the potential whistleblower as he was loyally attempting to correct from within.
165. 750 A.2d 283 (Pa. 2000).
166. Id. at 284.
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federal law. The court came to this conclusion not because it
disbelieved plaintiff, but because it did not want to weaken the state's
at will presumption, did not see sufficient third party effects,
mistrusted internal whistleblowers, and, apparently, feared that every
arcane rule in the C.F.R. would become fodder for employee suits.'67
The second element of the public policy tort involves proof that
the employer knew or suspected that the employee was engaged in
whistleblowing activities. Very little time in the cases is devoted to
this element, as long as the employer was actually aware of, or
suspected, the whistleblowing activity.168
The third element is the causal link between the knowledge of
the employee's complaint and the firing. Judicial analysis of the facts
is similar to that in the section 11(c) cases. The most damning
evidence against the employer is timing. When the employer learned
of the whistleblowing activity and fired an otherwise adequate
employee within a few hours or days, the firing is suspect. This is
especially true when coupled with a confrontation between the
employer and the employee, wherein the employer indicated his
knowledge of (and disgust with) the employee's whistleblowing.69
167. The McLaughlin court wrote:
[T]his Court has steadfastly resisted any attempt to weaken the presumption of at-will
employment in this Commonwealth. If it becomes the law that an employee may bring
a wrongful discharge claim pursuant to the "public policy" exception to the at-will
employment doctrine merely by restating a private cause of action for the violation of
some federal regulation, the exception would soon swallow the rule. While, of course,
this Commonwealth cannot enact laws that contravene federal law, we are not
required to override our longstanding policy regarding common law at-will
employment and thus provide a common law remedy for wrongful discharge simply
because Congress provides a federal statutory remedy to be brought in a federal
forum. Rather, we hold that a bald reference to a violation of a federal regulation,
without any more articulation of how the public policy of this Commonwealth is
implicated, is insufficient to overcome the strong presumption in favor of the at-will
employment relation.
Id. at 290. But see Brandon v. Anesthesia & Pain Mgmt. Assoc., Ltd., 277 F.3d 936, 942 (7th Cir.
2002) (giving examples of Illinois cases allowing reports of violations of federal law to give rise
to retaliatory discharge claims).
168. See Weidler v. Big J Enters., Inc., 953 P.2d 1089,1097 (N.M. Ct. App. 1997) ("We agree
that there must be some evidence that the employer was aware, either by suspicion or actual
knowledge, or the protected activity. A discharge based on a belief or suspicion of protected
activity is just as reprehensible as a discharge based on actual knowledge of protected
activity.").
169. See, e.g., Sherman v. Kraft Gen. Foods, Inc., 651 N.E.2d 708,709-10 (Ill. Ct. App. 1995)
(Employer learned of intention to give insulation sample to employer or to OSHA on May 11;
sample confiscated and plaintiff fired on May 12); Cerracchio v. Alden Leeds, Inc., 538 A.2d
1292, 1295 (N.J. Super. App. Div. 1988) (Employee filed a workers' compensation claim on
August 13 and complained to OSHA on August 15; on August 24 he went to work, his
supervisor asked about his OSHA complaint, "'shook his head,'" and informed the plaintiff that
he had been terminated as of August 13. That supervisor provided perfect proof of but for cause
by adding "if you weren't such a troublemaker you would still have a job here."); Weidler v. Big
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Correspondingly, plaintiff employees have a hard time convincing a
court of their employers' retaliatory motivation when a long time
passed between the employer's knowledge of the lodging of their
complaint and the termination."'o
The tort action provides a remedy for wrongful termination, but
seldom for other adverse employment actions, such as harassment or
demotion.7' Damages for wrongful termination include back pay and
front pay,72 including benefits,' lost perquisites,'7 4 bonuses,' and
J. Enters., Inc., 953 P.2d 1089, 1098-99 (N.M. Ct. App. 1997) (Plaintiff presented evidence of
threats, confrontations, and poor assignments; co-workers "testified that the phrase 'you talk,
you walk' applied at Big J." Apparently, the word throughout the company was, "Don't make
waves." There was testimony about an incident where a worker brought up a safety concern at
a safety meeting after which management was heard to say, "He's out of here." That worker
was laid off after shutdown.).
170. See, e.g., Sanders v. Culinary Workers Union Loc. No. 226, 804 F. Supp. 86, 100-01 (D.
Nev. 1992) (dismissing claim on summary judgment because the OSHA complaint was filed five
months before the termination, and there was ample evidence supporting a conclusion that the
employee was discharged for "purposefully disobeying company procedures which resulted in
substantial damage to an aircraft"); Altman v. Luther Coll., 14 I.E.R. Cas. (BNA) 1270 (Iowa
Ct. App 1998); Walker v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp. 335 S.E.2d 79, 86 (N.C. Ct. App. 1985)
(finding no claim where no evidence in record as to by how long safety concerns predated
discharge but could have been as much as three years); Beck v. Tribert, 711 A.2d 951, 958
(N.J.Super. App. Div. 1998) (mentioning the long span of time between the employee's written
and oral complaints and his termination, but holding that internal whistleblowers are not
protected.). However, in one case the knowledge was of OSHA complaints filed years before at
different places of work. But the employer could nonetheless be liable for retaliatory discharge
if that knowledge motivated the dismissal. Skillsky v. Lucky Stores, 893 F.2d 1088, 1094 (9th
Cir. 1990).
171. The public policy tort has generally not been extended to retaliatory demotions or
discrimination, Zimmerman v. Buchheit of Sparta, Inc., 645 N.E.2d 877, 879 (Ill. 1994), or
constructive discharge, Grey v. First Nat'l Bank of Chicago, 523 N.E. 2d 1138 (Ill. Ct. App.
1988). See generally Michael D. Moberly & Carolann E. Doran, The Nose of the Camel:
Extending the Public Policy Exception Beyond the Wrongful Discharge Context, 13 LAB. LAW.
371 (1997). But cases exist to the contrary. See, e.g., Brigham v. Dillon, 935 P.2d 1339 (Kan.
1997) (recognizing retaliatory demotion); Beye v. Bureau of Nat'1 Affairs, Inc., 477 A.2d 1197,
1202-03 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1993) (allowing action for abusive discharge to be founded upon
constructive discharge).
172. Back pay is income lost from the time of the discharge until the time of reinstatement,
finding new employment, or the date of judgment. Front pay is lost prospective, future earnings,
that is, the difference between what the employee would have made at the first job less what he
will make at his next job or jobs. See Besupre v. Smith Assoc., 738 N.E.2d 753, 767 n.25 (Mass.
App. 2000); see generally STEPHEN M. KOHN, CONCEPTS AND PROCEDURES IN WHISTLE-
BLOWER LAW 332-33 (2001); PAUL A. TOBIAS, LITIGATING WRONGFUL DISCHARGE CLAIMS §
8:05 (1999). The employee's life expectancy, years expected until retirement, promotions
expected, and other relevant factors must be taken into account to determine the amount, which
is then discounted to present value. See, e.g., Rasmussen v. Quaker Chem. Corp., 993 F.Supp.
677 (N.D. Iowa 1998); Smith v. Smithway Motor Xpress, Inc., 464 N.W.2d 682 (Iowa 1990).
173. The import of paying to restore benefits becomes more crucial when one considers that
many whistleblowers are older, and will have a difficult time replacing health and life insurance
policies. See Boyle v. Vista Eyewear, Inc., 700 S.W.2d 859, 877-88 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985).
174. One whistleblower was allowed to recover the replacement value of his company car
and insurance benefits. Potter v. Village Bank of N.J., 543 A.2d 80 (N.J. Super. 1988).
175. Id. at 88 (bonuses and vacation pay).
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projected promotions. 17 Plaintiff is subject to the avoidable
consequences rule, and money earned elsewhere will serve as an
offset. 7  Plaintiffs may recover for emotional distress, other
foreseeable compensatory damages,7 9 and punitive damages.8 o This
tort action is normally tried before a jury."'
III. THE EFFECT OF SECTION 11(C) ON THE VIABILITY OF THE
PUBLIC POLICY TORT
"The courts should not use statutes designed to shield employees from retaliation
as a sword to eliminate such rights. ""
The existence of section 11(c) should not preclude state courts
176. Nelson v. United Technologies, 88 Cal. Rptr. 2d 239, 251-52 (Cal. App. 1999).
177. Sterling Drug, Inc. v. Oxford, 743 S.W.2d 380, 387 (Ark. 1988). One state court, finding
that a discharge was "malicious," alleviated "the duty of mitigating by seeking new employment,
even if comparable employment was available." Seymore v. Pendleton Community Care, 549
S.E.2d 662, 667 (W.Va., 2001). For an example of deduction of mitigating income from a
backpay award, see Wilkins v. St. Louis Housing Auth., 197 F. Supp. 2d 1080, 1090 (E.D. Mo.
2001) (relief founded upon False Claims Act and state common law tort of unjust termination).
178. A separate cause of action may be brought for intentional infliction of emotional
distress, but emotional distress damages should also be available as a consequence of the
wrongful discharge. See, e.g., Perry v. Hartz Mountain Corp., 537 F. Supp. 1387 (S.D. Ind. 1982);
Nibb v. Parr Mfg., Inc., 445 N.W.2d 351 (Iowa 1989). Remnants of some of the traditional limits
on emotional distress still may be found, like requirements of physical manifestations or
extremely outrageous treatment. For a case discussing emotional distress in a whistleblowing
context, see Hentzel v. Singer Co., 188 Cal. Rptr. 159 (Cal. Ct. App. 1982). For an award of
emotional distress damages in the OSHA context, see Weidler v. Big J Enter., Inc., 953 P.2d
1089, 1099-1100 (N.M. Ct. App. 1997).
179. Such damages may include lost reputation, costs of seeking alternative employment, or
even foreseeable loss of property due to lost stream of income from paychecks. See, e.g.,
Johnson v. Oroweat Foods Co., 785 F.2d 503, 509 (4th Cir. 1986); Montgomery Coca-Cola
Bottling Co. v. Golson, 725 So.2d 996, 1000 (Ala. Ct. App. 1998).
180. See, e.g., Rhein v. ADT Auto. Inc., 930 P.2d 783, 791 (N.M. 1996) (error to refuse
instruction on punitive damages). State punitive damage award have been recently constricted
on constitutional gounds by the Supreme Court. BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559
(1996). Punitive damages are often limited in state "tort reform" statutes. Punitive damages
awarded by a jury were upheld, in an 8 to 1 ratio with actual damages, in Weilder v. Big J
Enters., Inc., 953 P.2d 1089, 1102 (N.M. Ct. App. 1997). That case provides a window into how
the proof and jury instructions may unfold when a statutory action dovetails with the common
law wrongful termination case.
181. Holien v. Sears, Roebuck & Co, 689 P.2d 1292, 1303 n.8 (Ore. 1984) (sex discrimination
case addressing possibility of jury trial in common law action but not for statutory claim). See
generally, Robert Roy, Annotation, Right to Jury Trial in Action for Retaliatory Discharge from
Employment, 52 A.L.R. 4th 1141 (1987 & Supp. 2002).
182. STEPHEN M. KOHN & MICHAEL D. KOHN, THE LABOR LAWYER'S GUIDE TO THE
RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF EMPLOYEE WHISTLEBLOWERS 113 (1989). The Kohns write
of the lack of consistency in state and federal approaches to preemption and preclusion issues.
"The most troubling paradox has developed in labor law: Unfair and discriminatory labor
practices, which were so outrageous or troubling as to spark specific legislative actions, are now,
in some jurisdictions, subject to less protection than unfair or discriminatory labor practices
which are not as threatening to the public welfare." Id. (Emphasis in original).
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from allowing the public policy tort to be brought in the OSHA
whistleblower context. But some state courts, or federal courts
applying state law, have used the existence of OSHAct section 11(c)
as a reason to preclude tort recovery. The clearer course for those
courts would be to address their concerns about the foundations or
consequences of the tort, rather than shrouding those concerns in
confusing terms and muddled doctrines.
Courts have concluded that the OSHAct prevents state tort
recovery for the following reasons: 1) Taylor'. concerns, that a public
policy tort is merely a backdoor means to a private action under
section 11(c); 2) statutory exclusion analysis, including (a) focusing on
adequacy of remedy, and (b) other legislative intent inquiries; and 3)
federal preemption. When these concerns meet up with any
remaining judicial hostility to inroads on the at will doctrine, judges
may seize on them to refuse to allow the public policy tort.18
A. No Private Right of Action - Taylor Concerns
The Taylor case, refusing to allow a private cause of action under
OSHAct section 11(c), is often summarily cited by state courts
denying common law claims for wrongful discharge or related torts."'
Some states spell out that they will not allow what is in effect a
private action under section 11(c), or under an analogous state
OSHAct, to come in through the back door of a common law cause of
action.' The Court of Special Appeals of Maryland, faced with a
complaint for abusive discharge,'87 summed up the position:
[T]he exclusive remedy for that violation lies under MOSHA [the
Maryland OSHAct]. As this case in particular demonstrates, any
other view would seriously undermine the coherent administration
183. Taylor v. Brighton Corp., 616 F.2d 256 (6th Cir. 1980), discussed supra at text
accompanying notes 116-45.
184. See, e.g., Corbin v. Sinclair Mktg., Inc. 684 P.2d 265, 267 (Colo. Ct. App. 1984)
(disallowing public policy tort).
185. King v. Fox Grocery Co., 642 F. Supp. 288, 290 (W.D. Pa. 1986) (granting summary
judgment against plaintiff employee because statutory remedies were available and because
there was no private right of action under OSHA, citing Taylor); Hendrix v. Wainwright Indus.,
755 S.W.2d 411, 413 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988) (dismissing cause of action for "conspir[acy] to
terminate [employee] ... because of his involvement and filing of an [OSHA] complaint. .. in
direct violation of 29 U.S.C. section 660(c).' The court concluded, "[a]ny remedy for a
retaliatory discharge must come from within the agency. There is no private cause of action for
a violation of the Occupational Safety and Health Act. [citing Taylor]").
186. Silkworth v. Ryder Truck Rental, 520 A.2d 1124, 1127-28 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1987).
187. Id. The employee's dismissal arose from his refusal to work rather than retaliation
because of whistleblowing. Refusal to work cases are more complicated than whistleblowing
cases because they involve what would otherwise be insubordination.
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of MOSHA. The Commissioner investigated the very charge made
by appellant in this case and found no violation. His fact-finding,
under the statute, is conclusive; his legal conclusions can be tested
by judicial review under the laws and rules governing
administrative appeals. What appellant wants is for a court, in an
original tort action, to review his factual and legal contentions de
novo and to reach conclusions contrary to those of the
Commissioner. That would emasculate the authority of the
Commissioner, however, and would run directly contrary to the
clear intent of the Legislature. It would also create the anomalous
situation of an employee whose claim is found by the
Commissioner to have merit being restricted to the statutory
remedy of reinstatement and back pay, but an employee whose
claim is found to have no merit being able to seek compensatory
and punitive damages from a jury.
While there is some appeal to this argument, it need not lead to
the disavowal of all state public policy tort causes of action, because
the purposes of the state common law action may be different from
those of Congress in enacting the OSHAct. Torts seek to prevent and
remedy breaches of the social contract, goals that may be farther-
reaching than the enforcement of a specific statute. States are
concerned with the employment and unemployment of their citizens,
and the concomitant effect on the state coffers. The calculi of
compensation, deterrence, retribution and administrative costs may
be different at the state tort level than at a federal administrative
agency. This difference in perspective is acknowledged and approved
by the OSHAct itself, which makes clear that the states are free to
provide more protection to their citizens than Congress chose to
impose on the entire country.18 9
In Holmes v. Schneider Power Corp.," a federal district court
applying Pennsylvania law correctly separated two arguments. "One
issue is whether this court should find an implied right of action under
the OSHA statute as a matter of federal law. It is an entirely separate
issue for this court to decide whether Pennsylvania courts would find
a common law cause of action in this case, i.e. wrongful discharge in
violation of a public policy."9 9
The court answered the first question in the negative by citing
Taylor. The court reasoned, "The plaintiff has had the benefit of the
administrative remedy provided. The Secretary's decision not to bring
188. Id. at 1128.
189. See infra text accompanying notes 255-58.
190. 628 F. Supp. 937 (W.D. Pa. 1986).
191. Id. at 939.
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suit does not deprive plaintiff of his statutory remedy.1 92
The court then discussed what the Pennsylvania state courts
would do if presented with the common law complaint. The court
indicated its reluctance "to glibly expand state law."' 93 The court
refused to find a state law cause of action, because of lack of
Pennsylvania precedent and a sense that the facts did not support the
claim."'
This is an appropriate decision. The question is not whether
Taylor prevents the bringing of the state tort, but rather whether the
lawmakers of the state - legislative or judicial - have chosen to allow
the state tort. As a federal judge, the Holmes judge was
understandably reluctant to hold that a state cause of action would
lie. His hesitation may well have been prophetic, in view of the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court's decision in McLaughlin.1 95
B. Statutory Exclusivity
The existence of section 11(c) raises the question whether
legislative action in the area should preclude judicial, common law
activity. One judicial approach looks at statutory remedies and
procedures, asking whether the legislative provisions are adequate.
Walsh v. Consolidated Freightways, Inc.9' is a leading case that
employs this analysis. This leads to a comparison of plaintiffs' rights
and remedies under section 11(c) and the public tort. Statutory
exclusivity may also be analyzed from another perspective, one that
attempts to ascertain the intent of the legislators, scrutinizing not only
the remedies and procedures, but also the timing of the legislation
and other indicia of legislative intent vis-a-vis the common law.
1. Remedial Adequacy - Walsh Concerns
Should state common law create a tort remedy if a statutory
remedy exists? This question is similar to but distinct from the Taylor
question of whether section 11(c) allows a private right of action.19
192. Id.
193. Id. at 940.
194. Id.
195. McLaughlin v. Gastrointestinal Specialists, Inc 750 A.2d. 283 (Pa. 2000). Indeed, the
McLaughlin court found in Holmes support for its proposition that enforcement of federal law
is not a state policy in Pennsylvania. Id. at 289-90.
196. 563 P.2d 1205 (Or. 1977).
197. In Cerracchio v. Alden Leeds, Inc., 538 A.2d 1292 (N.J. Super. Ct., App. Div. 1988), the
court recognized this question:
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The Oregon Supreme Court addressed this question in Walsh v.
Consolidated Freightways, Inc.198
The Oregon court had been a leader in creating the public policy
tort, holding in 1975 that an employer could not legally discharge an
employee "solely for refusing to ask to be excused from jury duty."'99
Two years later, in Walsh, the court confronted a jury verdict for a
plaintiff who was discharged apparently because he "complained
rather adamantly" to his foreman and his union representative about
the potential health hazard presented by blue clouds of noxious-
smelling smoke emanating from a forklift.20 The court wrote:
Although the situation in this case is similar [to the discharged
potential juror], there is one decisive difference. It is true, of
course, that the community has a strong interest in maintaining safe
working conditions. That interest has been expressed in both state
and federal statutes. Correspondingly, we would agree that
employers should not be allowed to discharge employees solely for
complaining about safety problems. However, unlike the [potential
juror], an employee who is discharged because he complained for a
safety violation is provided a remedy under existing law for his
wrongful discharge.
After describing section 11(c) procedures, the Walsh court
pointed out, " [I]t is apparent that plaintiff was aware of this remedy,
for the record indicates that he, in fact, did file a complaint pursuant
to [section 11(c)]."202 The court noted the adequacy of both the
section 11(c) remedies and similar remedies under state statute,2 03 and
concluded, "Therefore, we find it unnecessary to extend an additional
[I]t is clear that this statute does not 'create' a private right of action for an employee
who is discharged for reporting a safety violation. [citing Taylor] The question,
however, is whether it prohibits such an action. On its face, no such prohibition exists
in the statute, and it seems to us that the statute does not preclude an employee from
instituting an action in New Jersey, under a recognized tort or contract theory.
Id. at 1298 (citing Kennard v. Louis Zimmer, 632 F. Supp. 635 (E.D. Pa. 1986)), but recognizing
that contrary authority existed). Similarly, the Holmes court remarked in passing, "It is
noteworthy that Pennsylvania courts have found a common law action based on the public
policy exception only in cases where no statutory remedy is available." 628 F. Supp. at 939
(emphasis in original).
198. 563 P.2d 1205 (Or. 1977).
199. Id. at 1205 (citing Nees v. Hocks, 536 P.2d 512 (Or. 1975)).
200. Id. at 1207-78. A clear undercurrent in the case was that the discharge may have been
partially motivated by the employer's displeasure that plaintiff was attempting to organize the
casual employees who were not covered by the union contract. Id. at 1207, 1209-10.
201. Id. at 1208 (citations omitted).
202. Id.
203. The state provisions were not in effect at the time of the conduct. Id. at 1208 & n.1.
The highest court of a state, however, charged with making precedent as well as adjudicating the
matter at hand, was obligated to consider how similar scenarios would play in future workplace
disputes.
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tort remedy to cover this kind of situation."204 The Oregon court later
created a typology of public policy tort cases, using Walsh as the lead
example of a category "where an adequate existing remedy protects
the interest of society so that an additional remedy of wrongful
discharge will not be accorded."2 05
Several states have followed Walsh. For example, the Kentucky
Supreme Court, in Grzyb v. Evans,2 06 generally allowed the bringing
of a public policy claim at common law, but not as described in a
subsequent federal district court opinion, "when the statute creating
the public policy exception provides the structure for pursuing a
claim." 207 In the latter cases, " [t]he statute not only creates the public
policy but preempts the field of its application."2 08 The only statutes
that can be the basis for the public policy tort are penal statutes, or
statutes that do not prescribe any remedy.
Grzyb arose in the sex discrimination context, but a federal
district court in Kentucky used it as precedent to disallow a
whistleblower to sue under the Kentucky public policy tort, where the
source of the policy was alleged as the federal and state OSHActs.20 9
In a brief paragraph, the court rejected the public policy tort under
Kentucky law, because the federal OSHAct section 11(c) and the
Kentucky OSHAct statute210 already create what is basically a public
policy exception to the at will rule, and "provide a structure for
employees to pursue when alleging violations. ,211
Other courts have rejected Walsh, finding that the OSHAct
204. Id. at 1208-09.
205. Dalaney v. Taco Time Int'l, Inc., 681 P.2d 114, 118 (Or. 1984).
206. 700 S.W.2d 399 (Ky. 1985).
207. Hines v. ELF Atochem N. Am., Inc., 813 F. Supp. 550, 552 (W.D. Ky. 1993). See
Grzyb, 700 S.W.2d at 401 ("Where the statute both declares the unlawful act and specifies the
civil remedy available to the aggrieved party, the aggrieved party is limited to the remedy
provided by the statute."). Grzyb disallowed a public policy cause of action which rested on the
state sex discrimination statute as the source of the policy because the statute provided its own
remedial structure.
208. Id. The court's use of the term "preemption" is technically accurate, but can cause
confusion because it brings to mind "federal preemption." See infra text accompanying notes
326-38.
209. Hines v. Elf Atochem N. Am., Inc., 813 F. Supp. 550 (W.D. Ky. 1993). The Hines court
wrote that the federal and state OSHActs "preempt" the state policy tort. Id. at 552. This
usage is even more confusing than the "preemption" language in Grzyb, because of the
federal/state tension present in Hines.
210. Ky. REV. STAT. ANN.§ 338.121(3)(b) (2001).
211. Hines, 813 F. Supp. at 552. This was not a whistleblower case. The employee alleged
that she was harassed and retaliated against, and suffered stress because she refused to comply
with order that she not make OSHA incident reports, falsify OSHA records and provide
confidential employee informational records. Id. at 551.
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provides insufficient structure or remedies to justify dismissal of the
public policy tort claim. The Missouri Court of Appeals has reasoned,
"A statutory remedy shall not be deemed to supersede and displace
remedies otherwise available at common law in the absence of
language to that effect unless the statutory remedy fully comprehends
and envelops the remedies provided by common law."212 The court
allowed the state tort, finding the OSHA remedy incomplete.213 The
court noted that because of the lack of a private right of action under
OSHA, the employee has no control over the decision to bring suit
and what relief to seek.2 14  Also, the court found, the short, 30-day
statute of limitations further restricts the employee's right to relief.211
Similarly, in Kilpatrick v. Delaware County Society for Prevention
of Cruelty to Animals, 2 16 a federal court in Pennsylvania rejected a
"state based preemption argument, , and allowed the tort under
state law. The court's conclusion was based partially on the facts of
the case - plaintiff had complained to Pennsylvania agencies about
violations of Pennsylvania law, so she did not have an OSHAct
claim.218 The court further found it unlikely that the Pennsylvania
courts would entrust enforcement of state law to the federal Secretary
of Labor, especially since the vigor of federal officials enforcing
OSHA "waxes and wanes depending upon the prevailing political
winds blowing toward Washington."21 9 The court concluded that the
public policy tort should be allowed.220
212. Shawcross v. Pyro Prods., Inc., 916 S.W.2d 342, 345 (Mo. Ct. App. 1995) (citations
omitted).
213. Id.
214. The court distinguished the Fair Labor Standards Act, which enumerates more relief
for the wrongfully discharged employee than does the OSHAct. Id.
215. Id.
216. 632 F. Supp. 542 (E.D. Pa. 1986).
217. Id. at 548-50. The use of the word "preemption" here creates confusion between the
Walsh concerns about separation of powers and the federalism concerns in the federal
preemption cases, discussed infra notes 299-325 and accompanying text.
218. Id. at 948-49. This conclusion is not in line with the broad language of 29 C.F.R. §
1977.9(b) (2001): "Complaints registered with other Federal agencies which have the authority
to regulate or investigate occupational safety and health conditions are complaints 'related to'
this Act. Likewise, complaints made to State or Local agencies regarding occupatioal safety and
health conditions would be 'related to' the Act." Kilpatrick may seem to be dissonant with
Holmes, see supra notes 190-94 and accompanying text. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
reconciled the two by pointing out that the Kilpatrick plaintiff had complained to the
Commonwealth whereas the Holmes plaintiff had complained to OSHA. McLaughlin, 750
A.2d at 289 n.14.
219. Kilpatrick, 632 F. Supp at 550.
220. The McLaughlin court, 14 years later, again noted the lack of congruence and trust
between the federal OSHA and the state, but this time to the employee's disadvantage. See
notes 165-67 and accompanying text.
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This leads to the central question of how plaintiff's rights and
remedies compare as between section 11(c) and the public policy tort.
Various inadequacies in the section 11(c) protections emerge when it
is compared to the public policy tort: reduced compensation to the
plaintiff whistleblower,221 commensurate reduced punishment of the
offending employer, and less control over the lawsuit on the part of
the whistleblower. Examination of the federal statutory procedures
and remedies may lead to the conclusion that the Walsh court was
cavalier in relegating its state's citizens to the federal arena. Rather
than summarily citing Walsh, state courts should examine the
OSHAct remedies and procedures alongside the potential tort
remedies and procedures. A state court may well conclude that its
own tort processes and recoveries provide more protection to the
citizens of its state.223
2. Legislative Intent to Exclude Common Law Rights and Remedies
Legislatures have the power to protect and compensate the
citizens of their states by creating remedial schemes that exclude
common law rights of action. When legislatures fail expressly to
exclude common law remedies, an argument remains that a desire for
exclusivity should be implied. Although these arguments usually
arise with regard to state legislation, they are so closely related to,
and so often mixed in with, analyses of the federal OSHAct that they
will be briefly introduced here.
The analysis of an implicit statutory preclusion of common law
remedies often emphasizes timing. As the California Court of Appeal
observed, "When a new right, not existing at common law, is created
by statute, that statutory remedy is exclusive. For rights which already
existed at common law before creation of the statutory right,
however, the statutory remedy is usually regarded as merely
cumulative, permitting the plaintiff to pursue the common law
remedy as well." 224
221. For example, the author found no 11(c) cases awarding emotional distress damages, but
emotional distress recovery is granted in state tort cases. See supra note 178.
222. Compare, Reich v. Cambridgeport Air Sys., Inc., 26 F.3d 1187 1190 (1st Cir. 1994)
(under § 11(c) punitive award two times the amount of back pay) with Weilder v Big J. Enters.,
Inc., 953 P.2d 1089, 1100 (N.M. Ct. App. 1995) (under state retaliatory discharge claim, punitive
award in a ratio of 8:1 with compensatory damages, which included lost wages and emotional
distress).
223. See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 213-15.
224. Cabesuela v. Browning-Ferris Indus. of Cal., Inc., 80 Cal. Rptr. 2d 60, 64 (Cal. Ct. App.
1998).
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Application of this doctrine in the context of OSHA and the
common law raises interesting issues of timing. The basic OSHAct
was passed in 1970. Most states began recognizing the common law
public policy tort in the 1980s. It could be argued that the remedial
scheme of the federal OSHAct predated and hence excluded the
common law tort remedy. On the other hand, most state
whistleblower statutes were enacted in the late 1980s and early 1990s,
after the public policy tort was recognized in many jurisdictions.
Exclusivity claims, based on either the OSHAct or state
whistleblower statutes, are usually unsuccessful, largely because the
courts do not simply apply a "time line" approach. Rather they also
look to legislative intent and remedial sufficiency.22 5 For example,
defendants in Gutierrez v. Sundance Indian Jewelry, Inc.226 argued that
the New Mexico OSHAct provided exclusive remedies. The court
did not agree, pointing out that a common law duty to provide
employees with safe workplaces predated the state OSHAct. The
statute merely codified the pre-existing duty. The public policy tort
"supports, and is often necessary to reinforce" the statute.227 Nothing
in the statutory language indicated an intent that the statutory
remedies be exclusive; 228 on the contrary, the broadly worded
preamble disavowed an attempt to diminish common law rights.229
Similarly, a sharply divided Ohio Supreme Court, in Kulch v.
Structural Fibers, Inc.,230 allowed a public policy tort to rest on the
state whistleblower protection act, but not before pausing to consider
various exclusivity concerns. The Kulch analysis demonstrates how
close these concerns are to each other, and how they overlap. The
Kulch court studied state statutory whistleblower remedies and
decided they were not adequate standing alone. Rather, tort remedies
would complement the statute. Although Kulch did not cite Walsh or
its progeny, it rejected the rule that the existence of statutory
225. For a detailed example of the process used to determine legislative intent in this regard,
in the sexual harassment context, see Hobien v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 689 P.2d 1292, 1300-1304
(Or. 1984).
226. 868 P.2d 1266 (N.M. Ct. App. 1993).
227. Id. at 1273.
228. Id. at 1274. Accord Reed v. Municipality of Anchorage, 782 P.2d 1155, 1158-59 (Alaska
1989)
229. Gutierrez, 868 P.2d at 1274-75. The preamble also declines to "enlarge" common law
rights, which ironically lead the dissent to find no statutory hook for the public policy tort. Id. at
1281 (Hartz, J., dissenting).
230. 677 N.E. 2d 308, 329 (Ohio 1997). For criticism of Kulch, see Margaret M. Koesel et al.,
Will the Real Legislature Please Stand Up? A Response to Kulch v. Structural Fibers, Inc.:
Clarifying the Public Policy Exception, 46 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 19 (1998).
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remedies would preclude the tort.231
The Kulch majority then addressed the timing issue,232 concluding
that the statute was "never intended to preclude the future
development of the common law of this state in the area of
'whistleblowing."' 23' The majority wrote, "[JI]f the General Assembly
had truly intended to make [the statute] the sole and exclusive
remedy for whistleblowers, it certainly knew how to do so."2 3 4 Finally,
the court addressed separation of powers concerns, concluding, "The
employment-at-will doctrine was judicially created, and it may be
judicially abolished."235 Thus the majority put the burden on the
legislature to make clear its intention to abrogate the court's
dominion over the common law.
In the context of the OSHAct, Congress not only expressly
declined to exert exclusive control over workers' rights or over health
and safety in the workplace,236 but also expressly stated that the
federal legislation provided a minimum, not a maximum, of worker
protection.23 Thus, the better path for courts to follow is to address
directly the reasons for and effects of allowing or disallowing the tort,
rather than relying on the statutory exclusivity doctrine.
C. Federal Preemption
The preemption doctrine, as enunciated, is fairly straightforward,
but its application is difficult to predict.238 The source of preemption
doctrine is the supremacy clause of the United States Constitution
which declares that "the Laws of the United States ... shall be the
supreme Law of the Land.. ."239 The "ultimate touchstone"240 of the
inquiry is congressional intent. This intent should be manifested fairly
231. 677 N.E.2d at 325.
232. Id. at 325-27. The Ohio whistleblower protections had a convoluted history.
233. Id. at 326. This holding invalidated a string of Ohio appellate and federal district court
cases. See id. at 327.
234. Id. at 326.
235. Id. at 328.
236. 29 U.S.C. § 667(a) (2000).
237. Id. § 667(c)(2).
238. "It is difficult in this area - even more so than in others - to apply the rationale
underlying a decision in one field to the problem in another context." JOHN E. NOWAK &
RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 348 (6th ed. 2000); See also ERWIN
CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 377 (2d ed. 2002).
239. U.S. CONST., art. VI, § 3, cl.2. See Gade v. Nat'l Solid Waste Mgmt. Ass'n., 505 U.S.
88, 108 (1992); but see Nash v. Fla. Indus. Comm'n, 389 U.S. 235, 239-40 (1967) (citing the
Supremacy Clause and cases going back to McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 436 (1819)).
240. Retail Clerks v. Schermerhorn, 375 U.S. 96, 103 (1963).
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clearly by Congress. "Exercise of federal supremacy is not to be
lightly presumed."241' This is especially true in areas traditionally
occupied by the states, involving the states' historic police powers.24
But, Professor Chemerinsky explains:
The problem, of course, is that Congress's intent, especially as to
the scope of preemption, is rarely expressed or clear. Therefore,
although the Court purports to be finding congressional intent, it
often is left to make guesses about purpose based on fragments of
statutory language, random statements in the legislative history,
and the degree of detail of the federal regulation.24
To determine congressional intent, courts look first for express
preemption. The words of the statute are analyzed to determine any
preemptive intent and, if so, to assess the scope of the preemptive
effect. When express preemption is lacking, courts look for implied
preemption. Implied preemption can be divided into two parts: 1)
field preemption, where the federal scheme is so pervasive that it can
be said that Congress left no room for state action, and 2) conflict
preemption.24 4 Conflict preemption can be further divided into (a)
true conflict preemption, where compliance with both the federal and
the state law is physically impossible, so the federal law takes
precedence, and (b) impediment, or purpose, preemption, where the
state law is an obstacle to accomplishment and execution of the full
purposes and objectives of Congress.245 If field preemption is found,
then the states cannot act in the area,246 because there is no room for
them to act. If conflict preemption is found, bits and pieces of the
state rules may be invalidated, but others may survive; the state law is
preempted only "to the extent that it actually conflicts with federal
241. Alessi v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 451 U.S. 504, 522 (1981).
242. Gade, 505 U.S. at 96. "Another reason for the presumption against preemption is that
although Congress can always amend its legislation if the courts interpret preemption too
narrowly, states are powerless to act, except by lobbying Congress, if the courts interpret
preemption too broadly." Note, Getting Away with Murder: Federal OSHA Preemption of State
Criminal Prosecutions for Industrial Accidents, 101 HARV. L. REv. 535, 541 n.40 (1987).
243. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 238, at 285.
244. Implied preemption can be divided several ways. Many courts discuss field preemption
and conflict preemption, dividing conflict preemption into two parts. See, e.g. Gade, 505 U.S. at
109 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). Justice O'Connor noted
that the categories can be recharacterized even to the point of understanding field pre-emption
"as a species of conflict pre-emption." Id. at 104.
245. This last category can also be called "purpose-conflict pre-emption." Id. at 115 (Souter,
J., dissenting). But hat term is confusing, given the use of differing state and federal egislative
purposes to save a state law in a field preemption context. See Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. State
Energy Resources Conservation a d Devel. Comm'n, 461 U.S. 190 (1983). The Supreme Court
includes impediment (or obstacle) preemption as one of two types of conflict preemption.
Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941); Gade, 505 U.S. at 98.
246. See, e.g., English v. General Elec. Co., 496 U.S.72, 82 (1990).
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law." 2 4 7 All of these categories overlap, and how they are divided may
well have an effect on preemption jurisprudence.2 48  For ease of
discussion, this article will adhere to fairly rigid categorization of the
preemption theories, keeping in mind that the touchstone of the
inquiry is congressional intent.2 49
Since the late 1970s, the number of preemption cases has risen,
partially because of a huge rise in the number of federal laws
concerning matters previously reserved to the states,250 and partially
because of the increased prominence of battles over so-called "states
rights." 251 Strange bedfellows can be found in preemption cases. In
the 1960s, federal law was often considered to be more protective of
individual rights than state law. Civil libertarians argued more often
for preemption and against states' rights. Then, by the late 1980s,
lawyers seeking to recover money on behalf of wronged employees
began to turn to state law for protection, as common law remedies
expanded. Champions of individual employees found themselves
arguing against rather than for federal preemption, and trumpeting
the rights of the states to assess damages.2 52
The best analysis is that the OSHAct does not preempt the state
public policy tort. Although the Supreme Court has yet to rule on the
issue, most other courts have arrived at this conclusion by studying
recent Supreme Court cases and the OSHAct itself.253 Because the
247. Field preemption blots out all state law touching on the preempted subject; conflict
preemption, on the other hand, merely chips away at it. See Pacific Gas, 461 U.S. at 203-0. See,
e.g., Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 278-7 (1984)(Powell, J., dissenting).
248. Gade, 505 U.S. at 109-11 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
249. The intent of the state actors must also be considered. If the state purpose is
significantly different from the federal purpose, the state law may not even be in the preempted
field. See, e.g., Pacific Gas, 461 U.S. at 213-17; English, 496 U.S. at 83-85.
250. NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 238, at 347 ( "In recent years Congress had enacted
legislation touching more and more areas that traditionally have been subject to state
regulation.").
251. See generally Shea C. Meehan & D. Benjamin Beard, What Hath Congress Wrought: E-
Sign, the UTEA and the Question of Preemption, 37 IDAHO L. REv. 389 (2001).
252. See, e.g., Schweiss v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 922 F.2d 473 (8th Cir. 1990).
253. See Schweiss v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 922 F.2d 473, 474-76 (8th Cir. 1990); Paige v.
Henry J. Kaiser Co., 826 F.2d 857, 864 (9th Cir. 1987); McElroy v. SOS Int'l, Inc., 730 F. Supp.
803, 808-09 (N.D. Ill. 1989); Kilpatrick v. Del. County Soc. for Prevention of Cruelty to Animals,
632 F. Supp. 542 (E.D. Pa. 1986); Lepore v. Nat'l Tool and Mfg. Co., 540 A.2d 1296, 1305-07
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.1988), aff'd, 557 A.2d 1371 (N.J. 1989).
One of the most cogent, succinct analyses of the non-preemptive effect of the OSHAct
on a public policy tort for discharge because of whistleblowing can be found in Lepore. The
analysis is pre-Gade, but still apt:
OSHA does not reflect express congressional intent to preempt the field of
occupational safety and health. To the contrary, as previously indicated, OSHA
specifically permits individual states to adopt a scheme of health and safety regulations
along with enforcement procedures so long as such standards are at least as vigorous as
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proper place to begin any inquiry into preemption is to look at the
words of Congress, this discussion is organized according to sections
of the OSHAct and proceeds along the following lines. First the
threshold question of field preemption will be answered, in the
negative, by section 18(a). Then the preemptive force of section 11(c)
will be discussed. Then a secondary preemption issue, presented by
section 18(b), will be addressed. Finally, the article takes a critical
look at lower court opinions, attempts to bring some clarity to the
competing analyses,254 and concludes that section 11(c) does not
preempt state public policy torts. Thus, if a court chooses to deny
recovery to wrongfully discharged OSHA whistleblowers, the court
needs to address the adequacy of remedies or consider other policy
concerns, not base its decision on federal preemption rules.
1. Is the Field Preempted? Section 18(a)
Section 18(a) of the OSHAct provides, "Nothing in this chapter
those required by OSHA and have been approved by the Secretary of Labor. Beyond
that, OSHA gives states express authority to regulate areas of health and safety not
governed by an OSHA standard. Thus, preemption under OSHA arises only where a
state law or regulation concerns an occupational safety and health matter governed by
a specific federal standard and only where an approved state plan is not in effect.
OSHA, thus, does prohibit retaliatory discharges and establishes enforcement
procedures encompassing a remedy therefor. It does not, however, by its express
terms prohibit a state from providing an aggrieved employee an alternative remedy.
To the contrary, permitting an employee to pursue a state tort remedy is entirely
consistent with the overall congressional intent of encouraging states to "assume the
fullest responsibility for the administration and enforcement of their occupational
safety and health laws .... "
Lepore, 540 A.2d at 1306 (citations omitted).
254. In the area of workplace law there has been tension within the patchwork of state
common law, state statues and federal legislation that has been created since the passage of the
National Labor Relations Act of 1935. A complex preemption analysis in traditional union-
management labor cases occupied jurists and scholars for most of the 20th century.
Occasionally, in the OSHA whistleblower context, arguments arise about the preemptive effect
of the National Labor Relations Act, the Labor Management Relations Act, or some other
traditional labor act. Those claims are best addressed under the body of preemption law that
surrounds the traditional union-management statutes, and are not covered in this article. See
generally JULIUS G. GETMAN & BERTRAND B. POGREBIN, LABOR RELATIONS: THE BASIC
PROCESSES, LAW AND PRACTICE 333-61 (1988).
Traditional labor preemption cases work from a doctrinal matrix overlaid upon
standard preemption doctrine. That set of rules is beyond the scope of this article. However,
OSHA whistleblowing can occur in the union setting, which necessitates a careful separation of
the relevant causes of action, and hence of the relevant preemption rules. See, e.g., Platt v. Jack
Cooper Trans. Co., 959 F.2d 91 (8th Cir. 1992) (refusing to recast unsuccessful attempts at
grievance and NLRB relief as a state wrongful discharge cause of action); Washington v. Union
Carbide Corp., 870 F.2d 957 (4th Cir. 1989) (discussing the proper order of inquiry in
preemption cases, deciding that it can be appropriate for a court to address tate law claims on
the merits before resolving preemption inquiry pursuant to section 301 of the Labor
Management Relations Act); Paige v. Henry J. Kaiser Co., 825 F.2d 857 (9th Cir. 1987).
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shall prevent any State agency or court from asserting jurisdiction
under State law over any occupational safety or health issue with
respect to which no standard is in effect under [section 6] of this
title. ,255
Section 18(a) thus eschews any federal preemption of the field of
occupational safety and health.256 Indeed, various other sections of
the OSHAct demonstrate that Congress intended to share the field
with the states. For example, in section 2(b)(11), Congress states an
intent and purpose of "encouraging the States to assume the fullest
responsibility for the administration and enforcement of their
occupational safety and health laws." 257 Also, section 4(b)4 creates a
broad exception for worker injuries. It reads:
Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to supersede or in any
manner affect any workmen's compensation law or to enlarge or
diminish or affect in any other manner the common law or
statutory rights, duties, or liability of employers and employees
under any law with respect to injuries, diseases, or death of
251employees arising out of, or in the course of, employment.
A reader sympathetic to state causes of action might be tempted
to read the language "common law . . . rights . . . with respect to
injuries ... of employees arising out of, or in the course of,
employment" to include the economic and dignitary injury of being
fired in contravention of public policy. If so, Congress would have
expressly disavowed an intent to preempt the state tort. But the
common sense of the section 4(b)4 language, taken in its entirety,
relates to physical "injury, disease and death."259  So, our analysis
must continue.
255. 29 U.S.C. § 667(a) (2000).
256. The dissenters in Gade viewed section 18(a) as an express negation of field preemption.
505 U.S. 1116-21 (1992)(Souter, J., dissenting). Lower courts have also found that "Congress
explicitly decided that OSHA would not preempt the entire field of occupational health and
safety law." Kilpatrick, 632 F. Supp. at 548.
One case, on peculiar facts, indulges in some overbroad language to the effect that
OSHA has preempted the entire field of "assuring worker safety." Thornock v. State, 745 P.2d
324, 328 (Mont. 1987). At issue was a specific federal regulation governing sawmill safety,
which, because of section 18(b), preempted a Montana state inspection statute which had never
been submitted to or approved by the Secretary pursuant to section 18(b) procedures. Plaintiff
Thornock was seeking to use the state statute to create a tort duty of inspection upon the state.
Plaintiff's reasoning was that if there was a duty, the duty had been breached because the
sawmill was never inspected, leading to an unsafe situation, which in turn led to the "traumatic
amputation" of his arm.
257. 29 U.S.C. § 651(b)(11) (2000).
258. Id. § 653(b)(4).
259. Phillips v. Gen. Elec. Co., 881 F. Supp. 1553, 1556-58 (M.D. Ala. 1995).
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2. Is There a Conflict Between the State Tort and Section 11(c)?
Section 11(c) of the OSHAct covers the same general topic as
the public policy tort, namely, punishment of an employer who has
disciplined an employee solely for whistleblowing, and remuneration
of the wronged employee.26 0 But the punishment and remedies
provided by section 11(c) are considerably less onerous to the
employer, and less restorative to the employee, than those provided
by the public policy tort. 261 Also the procedures of section 11(c) result
in more screening of claims before they reach federal court, and allow
the wronged employee no control over the lawsuit. Do these
differences amount to a conflict worthy of a finding of preemption?
Clearly the public policy tort does not render impossible
prosecution of a section 11(c) action. Nor does the public policy tort
"impede" achievement of federal objectives.262 But does the state
cause of action amount to a dual set of conflicting regulations?263 Did
Congress intend that OSHA retaliation be subject only to the
penalties and procedures it set forth in section 11(c)? Is not this
especially convincing in cases where plaintiff seeks the tort remedy
after pursuing the federal administrative remedy?264 What of the
specter that state courts will become "inevitably entangle[d] ... in
interpreting the complex Federal regulations enacted pursuant to
260. 29 U.S.C. § 660(c) (2000).
261. Compare notes 172-80 supra and accompanying text with notes 73-107 supra and
accompanying text.
262. This standard is articulated in Nash v. Fla. Indus. Comm'n, 389 U.S. 235, 240 (1967).
There, the Court found preemption of a state law that denied unemployment benefits to those
who filed unfair labor practice charges with the National Labor Relations Board. The Court
considered that a key purpose of the National Labor Relations Act was to encourage the filing
of such charges. A state law that imposed a punishment for doing so was in conflict and deemed
preempted.
263. For example, in Gade, 505 U.S. at 92-94, the court was presented with substantially
different training requirements for workers who handle hazardous wastes. OSHA required,
inter alia, 3 days of on-site training; the state required 500 days. Four of the justices found
preemption, agreeing
that nonapproved state regulation of occupational safety and health issues for which a
federal standard is in effect is impliedly pre-empted as in conflict with the full purposes
and objectives of the OSHA Act. The design of the statute persuades us that Congress
intended to subject employers and employees to only one set of regulations, be it
federal or state, and that the only way a state may regulate an OSHA-regulated
occupational safety and health issue is pursuant to an approved state plan that
displaces the federal standards.
Id. at 98-99 (citations omitted).
The Gade plurality was discussing a training standard, in the context of section 18(b); a
state common law tort is not a state "standard" for the purposes of section 18(b), see infra notes
284-98 and accompanying text. But related arguments have been made by defendants arguing
the preemptive effect of section 11(c).
264. See Fragassi v. Neiburger, 646 N.E.2d 315, 317 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995).
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OSHA... lead[ing] to inconsistent interpretations, frustrating the
goal of a single, uniform set of requirements."2 65 Does allowing state
action undermine a possible congressional intent to have retaliatory
discharge complaints administratively screened before proceeding to
court?266
These arguments have some resonance, but they are somewhat
overblown, and are given correspondingly short shrift by the courts.
The emphases and results of the tort may differ from those of a
section 11(c) procedure. But the better view is that any conflicts that
do occur do not rise to levels required for federal preemption. This is
true for a variety of reasons.
First, section 2(b)(11) "encourag[es] the States to assume the
fullest responsibility for the administration and enforcement of their
occupational safety and health laws,"267 and section 18(c)(2) allows
states to develop safety plans "at least as effective" as those imposed
by the federal standards.268 OSHA sets a floor, not a ceiling, for the
protection of American workers. Tort consequences imposed by the
state judiciary are in keeping with those directives.
Second, the employment relationship and the public policy tort
have traditionally been in the realm of state law, and therefore a high
standard must be met to prove federal preemption.2 69 Third, the
Supreme Court has rejected arguments for field preemption in
ambiguous settings. In Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp.270 and English
v. General Electric Co. ,271 the Court allowed states to impose tort and
punitive damage liability beyond that authorized by federal nuclear
safety law.
265. Id. at 317-18. The Fragassi court dismissed this argument with the terse statement,
"Defendant's concern is overstated. State courts are capable of construing Federal
regulatory schemes." Id. at 318.
266. Schweiss v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 922 F.2d 473, 475 (8th Cir. 1990). The panel found
"no evidence that 'employees will forgo their [statutory] options and rely solely on state
remedies for retaliation.'" Id. at 475 (citing English, 446 U.S. at 87). The court presented no
evidence or reasoning for this conclusion, merely dismissed it as "too speculative a basis on
which to rest a finding of pre-emption," id., and found the case "indistinguishable from English
in any material way." Id at 476.
267. 29 U.S.C. § 651(b)(11) (2000).
268. Id. §667(c)(2) (2000). "Congress included a provision in [the OSHAct] whereby the
federal government allowed individual states to regulate health and safety, provided the states
adopted a scheme of regulation and enforcement at least as vigorous as that required by [the
OSHAct]." Paige v. Henry J. Kaiser Co., 826 F.2d 857, 864 (9th Cir. 1987) (citing 29 U.S.C.
§667). See also Germann v. Vulcan Materials Co., 106 F. Supp. 2d 1010, 1016 (S.D. Cal. 2000).
269. See Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 253-56 (1984).
270. 464 U.S. 238 (1984).
271. 496 U.S. 72 (1990).
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In Silkwood the Court determined that a jury could award
punitive damages in a civil case,272 sounding in strict liability and
negligence, even though the case arose out of the escape of plutonium
from a nuclear plant. 273 Nuclear power is strictly and solely regulated
by the federal law. Nonetheless, the Supreme Court found that the
preempted field did not extend as far as punitive damage awards.274
The court acknowledged the "tension" between the federal regulation
and the added and variable effect of punitive damages under state
law, but deemed that tension something that Congress "accepted,
tolerated and apparently authorized. "27  The test for preemption,
according to Silkwood, is whether there is an "irreconcilable conflict"
or "frustrat[ion] of objectives" between the state and federal rules.276
Silkwood found no preemption, even though, as the English court
later pointed out,
the tort claim in Silkwood attach[ed] additional consequences to
safety violations themselves, rather than to employer conduct that
merely arises from allegations of safety violations. [And even
though] the prospect of compensatory and punitive damages for
radiation-based injuries will undoubtedly affect nuclear employers'
primary decisions about radiological safety in the construction and
operation of nuclear power facilities ... .277
The English case comes even closer to the issue of OSHA pre-
emption. English was an employee at a nuclear facility. She engaged
in a fairly dramatic, disobedient demonstration that plant clean-up
was inadequate. She was fired. She filed a complaint with the
Secretary of Labor charging General Electric ("GE") with violating
the anti-retaliation provision of the Energy Reorganization Act of
1975. The complaint was dismissed as untimely. She then filed a
272. Silkwood, 464 U.S. at 255.
273. Id. at 256.
274. Id. at 249-56. This determination was arrived at after an examination of the legislative
history to learn why Congress chose to preempt the field of nuclear safety, and evidence of
congressional intentions vis-a-vis state tort recovery. Id. The holding was limited to recovery of
damages based on state law for radiation injuries. "We do not suggest hat there could never be
an instance in which the federal law would pre-empt the recovery of damages based on state
law." Id. at 256. The rigorous dissenters invoked a presumption against the viability of state law,
once the field has been determined to be preempted, and noted that the reason for the
preemption of the field would have been the desire to entrust to an expert body the "full
authority to issue comprehensive regulations and assess penalties." Id. at 280 (Powell. J.,
dissenting). This last argument carries less force in the OSHA context. as the drafters from the
beginning contemplated coexistent state workplace law, and even coexistent state occupational
health and safety law.
275. Georgene M. Vairo, Survey of Recent Tort Preemption Cases, C491 ALI-ABA 871, 877
(1990).
276. Silkwood, 464 U.S. at 256.
277. English, 496 U.S. at 86.
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diversity action against GE in the United States District Court for
wrongful discharge and intentional infliction of emotional distress,
seeking compensatory and punitive damages. The wrongful discharge
claim was not supported by state law and was not before the court.
Defendant GE argued that the remaining state tort action, for
intentional infliction of emotional distress, was preempted.
The Court allowed the state tort claim, even though the
workplace was covered by a federal statute that had preempted the
field. The court found "no 'clear and manifest' intent on the part of
Congress ... to pre-empt all state tort laws that traditionally have
been available to those persons who, like petitioner, allege
outrageous conduct at the hands of an employer. 2 18
Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc. ,279 also supports the public policy
tort against preemption by section 11(c) of the OSHAct. In
Cipollone, a plurality of the Court found that amendments to the
Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act expressly preempt
certain state tort failure-to-warn and fraudulent misrepresentation
claims, because those claims might result in the state court
"requir[ing] or prohibit[ing]" certain warning language on cigarette
boxes.2 80 But the plurality was cautious, in view of the presumption
against preemption of state tort and contract causes of action, and
highlighted that all common law claims were not preempted. Rather,
each common law claim must be scrutinized to see if it entered into
the zone that is expressly preempted.
A seven-member majority of the Cipollone Court found no
preemption of state claims for express warranties, fraudulent
misrepresentation and conspiracy to misrepresent. Those causes of
action derived from matters not based on smoking and health, but
rather on more general obligations - the duties to refrain from
breaching warranties, to refrain from material deception.2 82
This precedent supports a conclusion that the public policy tort
goes to a matter sufficiently distinct from that addressed by section
11(c) that preemption ought not to arise. The tort acknowledges a
general duty not to discharge an individual for improper reasons.
Although this may affect OSHA enforcement, it does not set new
278. Id. at 83 (emphasis added).
279. 505 U.S. 504 (1992).
280. Id. at 520-21.
281. Id. at 523-24.
282. Id. at 529-31.
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standards nor even create new duties regarding occupational safety
and health. State procedures may differ from those set out in section
11(c), and state liabilities may exceed those imposed by federal law,
but these differences do not amount to an impediment to the federal
law. Thus, authority supports several reasons why the public policy
tort is not in conflict with, or an impediment to, section 11(c).m
3. Is the State Tort a "State Plan" Which Must be Submitted to and
Approved by the Secretary of Labor Pursuant to Section 18(b)?
The OSHAct is replete with cessions of power from Congress to
the states. Besides those found at sections 18(a), 1(b)(11) and 4(b)4,
another can be found in section 18(b), which provides:
Any State which, at any time, desires to assume responsibility for
development and enforcement therein of occupational safety and
health standards relating to any occupational safety or health issue
with respect to which a Federal standard has been promulgated
under [section 6] of this title shall submit a State plan for the
development of such standards and their enforcement.
These state standards must be "at least as effective in providing safe
and healthful employment and places of employment as the standards
promulgated under [section 6]. 285
At first blush it may appear that a state common law tort could
be a state "plan" or a "standard," requiring approval from the
Secretary because it "related to [an] occupational safety or health
issue with respect to which a Federal standard has been
promulgated." In Gade v. National Solid Wastes Management
Association2 11 five justices agreed that a "State standard" within the
283. The Texas Court of Appeals has offered another reason why section 11(c) does not
preempt a state law tort action. In a case involving a claim for tortious interference with
contractual relations, the court rejected the defendants' argument that section 11(c) preempted
the claim. The court wrote:
[T]he language of the statute demonstrates that the whistleblower cause of action
through OSHA is permissive rather than mandatory. Indeed, [section 11(c)] states in
part that "[a]ny employee who believes that he has been discharged or otherwise
discriminated against by any person in violation of this subsection may ... file a
complaint with the Secretary.. ." . . . The intent here is clear. The language Congress
chose for this portion of the statue is permissive. Thus, employees are not required to
pursue their causes of action solely through OSHA, nor are they limited to OSHA
remedies.
Land v. Dow Chem. Co., 2000 WL 729401 at *3 (Tex. App. June 8, 2000) (emphasis in original).
The court further reasoned that because tort law was traditionally occupied by the state,
congressional intent to preempt must be clear and manifest. Id.
284. 29 U.S.C. § 667(b) (2000).
285. Id. § 667(c)(2).
286. 505 U.S. 88 (1992). In Gade, the justices used three different analytical approaches.
Justices O'Connor, Rehnquist, White, and Scalia, the plurality, found conflict/impediment
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meaning of section 18 is "a state law requirement that directly,
substantially, and specifically regulates occupational safety and health
is an occupational safety and health standard within the meaning of
the Act. That such a law may also have a nonoccupational impact
does not render it any less of an occupational standard for purposes
of pre-emption analysis. 287 Nonetheless, further analysis leads to the
conclusion that section 18(b) does not apply to the public policy tort.
First, there is no "federal standard which has been promulgated
under [section 6]" in the 11(c) context. The C.F.R. sections discussing
section 11(c) are described as a compilation of "interpretations" to
"guide the Secretary of Labor,"2 " rather than "standards," which
"requir[e] conditions, or adoption or use of one or more practices,
means, methods, operations or processes. 289 Second, the public
policy tort is not a "State standard" of the type contemplated by the
Gade Court290 or the drafters of section 18(b). A"state plan or
standard" is a positive enactment of a state legislature or
administrative agency requiring specific practices or processes,
rather than a common law rule. Many courts have ended their federal
preemption inquiry here, concluding that state common law duties
governing the employment relationship are simply not health and
safety standards.292
preemption. Id. at 99. Justice Kennedy, concurring, found express preemption by negative
inference in the reading of section 18. Id. at 111 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Justices Souter,
Blackmun, Stevens and Thomas, in dissent, would have required a far clearer expression of
preemptive intent by Congress before overturning the presumption of validity accorded to state
law. Id. at 115 (Souter, J., dissenting).
287. Id. at 107.
288. 29 C.F.R. § 1977.2 (2001).
289. 29 U.S.C. § 652(8) (2000).
290. In Gade, OSHA had promulgated regulations detailing training requirements for
employees engaged in hazardous waste operations, mandating three days of field experience for
certification. 505 U.S. at 92. After the OSHA interim regulations were in effect, the Illinois
Legislature, without approval from the Secretary of Labor, enacted rules detailing additional
requirements for the same personnel. Illinois required 500 days of experience (4,000 hours) for
licensing. Id. at 93-94. The articulated purposes of the state legislative enactment were "both
'to promote job safety' and 'to protect life, limb and property.'" Id. at 91. Despite the dual
purpose, a majority of the Court found the Illinois laws to be state occupational health and
safety standards. Id.
291. 29 U.S.C. §652(8).
292. See, e.g., McElroy v. SOS Int'l, Inc., 730 F. Supp 803, 807 (N.D. Ill. 1989); Fragassi v.
Neiburger, 646 N.E.2d 315, 317 (Ill. App.Ct.. 1995); see also People v. Chicago Magnet Wire
Corp., 534 N.E.2d 902, 968-75 (Ill. 1989) (finding that OSHAct does not preempt state personal
injury tort or criminal law). The question whether criminal laws and prosecutions constitute
"State standards" for the purposes of section 18(b) has attracted considerable attention. For
example, one commentator observed:
Standards are thus ex ante, prophylactic measures prescribing or proscribing specific
practices. In contrast, general state criminal laws covering homicide, manslaughter,
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But there is another point of view. Given the force of judge-
made law in the American system of jurisprudence, state courts do
"create" tort duties, which do have considerable force of law. The
high costs of breaching those duties are effective motivators for
compliance with the duty. In Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc.,9 a
majority of the Court noted that tort duties do indeed impose
"requirements or prohibitions, "294 and that "state law" includes
"common law as well as statutes and regulations. "295
Cipollone notwithstanding, it is difficult to argue that the state
public policy tort "directly, substantially, and specifically regulates
occupational safety and health"2 96 The state tort "directly" regulates
the employment contract, and the reasons for its termination. The
state tort limits the state-created at will rule. In deciding whether the
tort should be allowed, and determining its breadth, courts consider
the underlying public policy at issue. But they also take into account
the effect of their decision on the business climate of the state, the
employer's interest in running the business as he sees fit, the
employee's interest in job security and the stability of the job
market.2 97
battery, and reckless conduct are x post, reactive measures, focusing on conduct after
an injury has occurred. They do not prescribe specific "practices, means, methods,
operations, or processes" as such, but rather focus after the fact on whether conduct
causing an injury in particular circumstances was blameworthy, as measured by general
societal norms.
Note, Getting Away with Murder: Federal OSHA Preemption of State Criminal Prosecutions for
Industrial Accidents, 101 HARV. L. REV. 535, 542-43 (1987). This commentary applies to state
common law tort as well.
293. 505 U.S. 504 (1992). The Cipollone Court studied language in the Public Health
Cigarette Smoke Act of 1969 which specified: "No requirement or prohibition based on smoking
and health shall be imposed under State law with respect to the advertising or promotion of any
cigarettes the packages of which are [lawfully] labeled." Id. at 515 (emphasis added). Four
members of the Court concluded:
The phrase "[n]o requirement or prohibition" sweeps broadly and suggests no
distinction between positive enactments and common law; to the contrary, those words
easily encompass obligations that take the form of common-law rules. As we noted in
another context, "[state] regulation can be as effectively exerted through an award of
damages as through some form of preventive relief. The obligation to pay
compensation can be, indeed is designed to be, a potent method of governing conduct
and controlling policy."
Id. at 521.
294. Id. The majority's analysis was largely affected by the fact that Congress had
broadened its preemptive language between 1965 and 1969, thereby demonstrating a clearer
intent to preempt. Id. at 520. While a "requirement or prohibition" is broader than a "State
plan," the analysis is not dissimilar.
295. Id. at 522.
296. Gade, 505 U.S. at 107.
297. See Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 601 P.2d 1330, 1333 n.7 (Cal. 1980) (citing
academic commentary "exposing the arbitrariness" of the at-will doctrine); Adler v. American
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Certainly section 11(c) was included in the OSHAct to
encourage reporting of OSHAct violations and to discourage cover-
ups; tort remedies with punch enhance achievement of the same
goals. But the substantial influencing effect of the tort is on the
employer's decision to fire, not on the employer's eradication of the
occupational safety or health hazard. The public policy tort has an
insufficiently direct or specific effect on safety and health compliance
for section 18(b) to apply. Rather, the public policy tort lies in the
realm of section 18(a), so state courts are free to exercise jurisdiction
and provide remedies to discharged employees.2 98
4. Lower Court Decisions on Preemption
In Fragassi v. Neiburger,299 the Illinois Appellate Court recon-
ciled Gade and English in the OSHA context and correctly concluded
Std. Corp, 432 A.2d 464, 470 (Md. Ct. App. 1981); Pierce v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 417
A.2d 505, 509, 511-12 (N.J. 1980); Brockmeyer v. Dun & Bradstreet, 335 N.W.2d 834, 841 (Wis.
1983). These motivators are not "directly" related to occupational safety and health.
298. This conclusion is in line with English, 496 U.S. 72 (1990), which emphasized that "clear
and manifest" congressional intent must be found to preempt state common law that
"traditionally" has been available. Id. at 83. The English court, assessing how "directly related"
a state tort was to a federally protected area, included the following instructive language:
[N]ot every state law that in some remote way may affect the nuclear safety decision
made by those who build and run nuclear facilities can be said to fall within the pre-
empted field. We have no doubt, for instance that the application of state minimum
wage and child labor laws to employees at nuclear facilities would not be pre-empted,
even though these laws could be said to affect tangentially some of the resource
allocation decisions that might have a bearing on radiological safety. Instead, for a
state law to fall within the pre-empted zone, it must have some direct and substantial
effect on the decision made by those who build or operate nuclear facilities concerning
radiological safety levels. We recognize that the claim for intentional infliction of
emotional distress at issue here may have some effect on these decisions, because
liability fcr claims like petitioner's will attach additional consequences to retaliatory
conduct by employers. As employers find retaliation more costly, they will be forced
to deal with complaints by whistle-blowers by other means, including altering
radiological safety policies. Nevertheless, we believe that this effect is neither direct
nor substantial enough to place petitioner's claim in the preempted field.
Id. at 85. While English was a field preemption case, it is appropriate to look to it for aid in
resolving a conflict preemption question because "this kind of purpose-conflict pre-emption,
which occurs when state law is held to 'undermine a congressional decision in favor of national
uniformity of standards,' presents 'a situation similar in practical effect to that of federal
occupation of a field.'" Gade, 505 U.S. at 115-16 (Souter, J., dissenting) (quoting LAWRENCE
TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 486 (2d ed 1988)).
The Energy Reorganization Act of 1974 clearly preempts the field. Thus, the question
before the English court was whether the state tort was in the field. The OSHAct does not
preempt the field of workplace regulation and does not even preempt the field of occupational
safety and health, as is demonstrated by sections 18(a) and (b). Additionally, the state torts in
English were not covered in the Energy Reorganization Action of 1974, whereas the problem of
retaliatory discharge is directly covered by the OSHAct.
299. 646 N.E.2d 315 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995). Fragassi is cited with approval in Sherman v. Kraft
Gen. Foods, 651 N.E.2d 708, 713 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995).
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that the public policy tort is not preempted.'" In Fragassi, the plaintiff
employee was fired for suggesting to the employer that an OSHA
representative should conduct an inspection."'o She filed an action in
state court for retaliatory discharge. The trial court dismissed her
complaint relying on Gade.302 The appellate court reversed.03 The
court stressed that not every state law that "tangentially" affects
occupational safety and health is preempted.'0 It further stated,
"State causes of action are normally not preempted merely because
they impose liability over and above that authorized by Federal
law."305 It refused to allow Gade to cast a shadow over English or
over previous lower court decisions finding no federal preemption of
306the state tort. The court observed, " Gade did not overrule English,
but rather cited it with approval in delineating the proper scope of
Federal preemption."307
At least one lower court was expressly impatient with arguments
for federal preemption, denigrating them as "absurd,"'0' and "run of
the mill."3 09 Lower courts believe that they are promoting federal
policy by allowing the state tort. For example, a Missouri court found
no preemption of the state tort because there was no actual conflict,
and stated that it was promoting the "more just policy of allowing
plaintiffs remedies in addition to the single narrow remedy provided
by OSHA."'""
A case with interesting twists is Phillips v. General Electric Co.311
A terminated employee alleged that he was fired because he reported
300. Fragassi, 645 N.E.2d at 316-18.
301. Id. at 316.
302. Id.
303. Id. at 318.
304. Id. at 317.
305. Id.
306. The court cited McElroy, 730 F.Supp. 803 (N.D.111. 1989) and People v. Chicago
Magnet Wire Corp., 534 N.E.2d 962 (Ill. 1989) with approval, defending them against a charge
that Gade had rendered them "unreliable precedent." "We are not convinced that Gade has
wrought such a complete change in the scope of Federal preemption of State tort law. Fragassi,
646 N.E.2d at 318.
307. Fragassi, 646 N.E.2d at 318.
308. Kilpatrick v. Del. County Soc. for Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, 632 F. Supp. 542,
548 (E.D. Pa. 1986) (noting "it would be absurd for Congress to permit states to assert
jurisdiction over occupational safety and health issues [section 18(a)] while prohibiting states
from protecting employees who aid in the enforcement of state law by reporting suspected
occupational hazards to state agencies.").
309. Id. at 547.
310. Shawcross v. Pyro Prods., Inc., 916 S.W.2d 342, 344-45 (Mo. Ct. App. 1995).
311. 881 F. Supp. 1553 (M.D. Ala. 1995).
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unsafe practices to management personnel.12 He filed suit313 pursuant
to an Alabama code section prohibiting termination "solely because
the employee has filed a written notice of violation of a safety
rule. . . ."3 1 4 The employer argued that section 11(c) of the OSHAct
preempted the Alabama statute.1 The court disagreed, citing section
4(b)4 of the OSHAct, which saves from preemption any "common
law or statutory rights, duties or liability of employers and employees
under any law with respect to injuries, disease, or death of employees
arising out of, or in the course of, employment."3 1 6 The court found
that the Alabama code section was a workers' compensation
provision, "pertain[ing] to employee injuries arising out of the em-
ployment context,"' and therefore fitting "neatly and comfortably"3 18
into the section 4(b)4 savings clause. But, ironically, the saving of the
Alabama code section proved to be the undoing of plaintiff's claim.
To use section 4(b)4 to save the state code section from preemption,
the court gave the state code section an extremely narrow reading.319
Because plaintiff had not been physically injured, disabled or killed,
he could not invoke the narrowly contoured state statute, and
employer's summary judgment motion was granted.32 0
In a case arising in New Jersey,3 2' an employer sought to use
section 11(c) as a preemptive sword, invoking the "complete
preemption doctrine,"3 22 in an attempt to remove state OSHA
312. Id. at 1555. Also implicit were allegations of discrimination because he attempted to
assist and train an African-American employee, which irritated superiors who favored whites.
Id.
313. The action was filed in state court and was removed to federal court. Id. at 1556.
314. Id. at 1557 (quoting ALA. CODE § 25-5-11.1).
315. Id. at 1557-58.
316. Id. at 1558 (quoting 29 U.S.C. §653(b)(4)).
317. Id.
318. Id.
319. Indeed, the court's reading of the statute strains credulity. Section 25-5-11.1 of the
Alabama code protects employees for termination "solely because the employee has filed a
written notice of a violation of a safety rule pursuant to subdivision (c)(4) of section 25-5-11."
Section 25-5-11(4) defines willful conduct as "willful and intentional violation of a specific
written safety rule of the employer after written notice to the violating employee by another
employee who, within six months after the date of receipt of the written notice, suffers
injury. . . ." It does not at all follow that an employee giving the written notice was not
protected by section 25-5-11.1 merely because he was never injured. In fact, if section 25-5-
11(4) has the desired result, after written notice is served the problem will be corrected and no
one will be hurt. It is oddly perverse, and not at all mandated by the language of section 25-5-
11.1, to say that one is protected from retaliation only if one is physically hurt, not if one is
acting in accord with statute.
320. Id. at 1558.
321. Kozar v. AT&T. 923 F. Supp. 67, 68-72 (D.N.J. 1996).
322. Id. at 69-70. Kozar defined the "complete preemption" doctrine as a corollary to the
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statutory claims and common law retaliatory discharge claims to
federal court. The federal district court declined jurisdiction because
the federal cause of action was not comparable to the state causes of
action.
The New Mexico Court of Appeals was willing to make the
blanket assertion that the OSHAct "was not designed to preempt any
common-law remedies."3 2 4 It found support in legislative history that
"indicates that Congress only intended to provide a parallel remedy
for breach of the common-law duty to provide employees a safe
workplace."32 5
D. Confusion and Clarity in the Courts
Appellate courts have correctly determined that the OSHAct
does not preempt the state public policy tort. But employer
defendants, and some trial courts, continue to make the argument
that federal preemption should apply. One reason may be the
understandable optimism of litigants, especially in a fuzzy area of law.
Also, confusion may result from the varying uses of the word
"preemption." Some courts use the term "preemption" to cover a
variety of arguments, including: 1) the Taylor v. Brighton3 26 question
of whether a private cause of action may lie; 2) statutory exclusion
questions; 3) federal preemption; or 4) a mixture of the above.
The best example of how courts sling these related words and
concepts around can be found in Braun v. Kelsey-Hayes Co.3 2 7 There,
a federal district court, applying Pennsylvania law, dismissed a
common law wrongful discharge claim by an employee who was
allegedly wrongfully discharged because he tried to correct safety
well-pleaded complaint rule. "This corollary ... applies when 'the Court has concluded that the
preemptive force of a statute is so 'extraordinary' that it 'converts an ordinary state common
law complaint into one stating a federal claim for purposes of the well-pleaded complaint rule.'"
Id. at 70 (quoting Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 393 (1987)). Kozar explained the
complete preemption doctrine quite well, and cited the other two cases in the OSHAct area
which declined complete preemption. Pitchford v. Aladdin Steel, Inc., 828 F. Supp. 610 (S.D. Ill.
1993); Lengel v. Fisher-Price, Inc., 1991 WL 224417 (W.D.N.Y. Oct. 28, 1991).
323. Kozar, 923 F. Supp. at 68-72.
324. Gutierrez v. Sundance Indian Jewelry, Inc, 868 P.2d 1266,1274 (N.M. Ct. App. 1993).
325. Id. (quoting S. Rep. No. 91-1282 (1970) reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5177, 5186).
This common law duty to provide a safe place to work has been recognized in New Mexico,
Koenig v. Perez, 726 P.2d 341 (N.M. 1986), and is generally recognized in the United States. See
PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS, § 80 (W. Page Keeton et al. eds., 5th ed. 1984).
326. 616 F.2d 256 (6th Cir. 1980). See supra notes 116-45 and accompanying text.
327. 635 F. Supp. 75 (E.D. Pa. 1986).
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problems.3 28 The plaintiff cited the OSHAct along with other statutes
to manifest the public policies which he charged were violated by his
discharge.3 29 The court found that the OSHAct had "preempted" the
common law right of action, because the OSHAct provides specific
and exclusive remedies "for corporate retaliation against employees
who participate in any action to carry out the purpose of the federal
statutes," relying exclusively on Taylor.30 The court also cited Walsh
for the point that " [s]ince OSHA provides a remedy for employees
that claim retaliatory termination, the plaintiff cannot maintain his
wrongful discharge action against he defendant."331 Braun was gently
but correctly criticized by a federal district court in Illinois, which
wrote:
With due respect, however, the court in Braun apparently based its
holding of preemption in part on the finding that Pennsylvania law
would not recognize that particular common law claim of
retaliation discharge. Because this court believes that the questions
of whether there is preemption and whether state law recognizes a
particular claim are entirely separate, it is reluctant to follow
Braun.332
Another example of judicial confusion in language emanates
from a federal district court in Kentucky.3 33 Refusing to find a cause
of action under Kentucky law, it wrote:
Both the federal OSHA statute, 29 U.S.C. §660(c), and the
Kentucky OSHA statute, K.R.S. § 338.121(3)(b), create a public
policy exception by prohibiting termination or discrimination
against employees who refuse to violate the statutes. Both statutes
provide a structure for employees to pursue when alleging
violations. These statutes preempt wrongful discharge claims based
on OSHA. Under the teaching of Grzyb the wrongful discharge
claims pertaining to OSHA will be dismissed.3 3 4
This finding of "preemption" was accomplished with none of the
search for legislative intent that the Supreme Court worked so hard
to wrest from various sources, and without resort to the Supremacy
Clause. This was more nearly an appeal to the Walsh doctrine.
The court in Kilpatrick v. Delaware County Society for
328. Id. at 79.
329. Id.
330. Id. at 80.
331. Id.
332. McElroy v. SOS Int'l, Inc., 730 F. Supp. 803, 809 n.7 (N.D.Ill. 1989).
333. Hines v. Elf Atochem, 813 F. Supp. 550 (W.D. Ky. 1993).
334. Id. at 552 (emphasis added).
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Prevention of Cruelty to Animals335 identified two types of preemption
arguments made by the defendant. One the court called "run of the
mill" field preemption.33 The other was characterized as follows:
[D]efendant argues that the existence of a remedy for plaintiff in
this case pursuant to OSHA would be viewed by the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court as a sufficient reason not to recognize a common
law cause of action for wrongful discharge. According to defendant,
even if Congress did not intend to preempt Pennsylvania law,
Pennsylvania courts would view the existence of a federal statutory
remedy as a sufficient reason to preempt voluntarily Pennsylvania
common law and the policies those laws are meant to further.
The court's considered the defendant's argument that state law would
not recognize the tort because of an available remedy under the
OSHAct. In a subheading the court referred to this argument as a
"state based preemption argument."3  The court could have avoided
confusion by reserving the term "preemption" for "federal preemp-
tion" and otherwise assessing the "exclusivity" of statutory remedies.
Happily, cases can be found that are models of clarity. For
example, in Lepore v. National Tool and Manufacturing Co.339 the
New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division distinguished the
federal preemption question from the Taylor concern that section
11(c) cannot be enforced by private parties.340 The court wrote:
Thus, only the Secretary of Labor is authorized to file a complaint
alleging a violation of [section 11(c)(1)]. The complaint here,
however, does not seek to remedy a violation of OSHA. Rather, as
discussed previously, plaintiff seeks to remedy a retaliatory
discharge in violation of state laws and public policy. It is entirely
distinct from a [section 11(c)(1)] private cause of action.3
The Lepore court further distinguished the Walsh exclusivity
argument that the common law complaint should be dismissed
"because there existed an available state administrative remedy."342
Ultimately the common law tort was allowed to run concurrently with
the federal administrative remedies.
335. 632 F. Supp. 542 (E.D. Pa. 1986).
336. Id. at 547.
337. Id. (emphasis added).
338. Id. at 548.
339. 540 A.2d 1296 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1988).
340. Id. at 1306-07.
341. Id. (citations omitted).
342. Id. at 1307.
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E. Other Policy Concerns
When courts decide whether to allow the public policy tort, the
real question they should address is how their states protect their
citizens. Citizens of the state include employees, employers,
consumers, users of the courts, taxpayers and everyone related to
these people. Choosing to allow or to disallow the tort has
ramifications that extend beyond the individual parties.
Courts should consider the following questions. Who will decide,
the legislature or the courts? What will be prohibited in the arena of
workplace actions? What will the enforcement mechanism be? If the
goal is to deter, and compensate for, retaliatory job action, who
should pay how much to whom? Who should control the proceeding?
Most importantly, what will the consequences of any rule be?
Both the public policy tort and section 11(c) seek to prevent
wrongful job action, that is, job action that is motivated by the desire
to punish OSHA whistleblowing. The question of motive is factual.
It is difficult to predict in advance what a fact finder will find. Given
that indeterminacy, the more money and other remedies available to
the employee, the more hesitant the employer will be to take negative
job action. This hesitancy may increase inefficiencies at the
workplace, affecting profits and other workers. The goods or services
produced by the employer may cost more to consumers. If the
individual employee, with his lawyer, controls the lawsuits, more
cases may be filed and they may take longer to settle than if control
rests with overworked, politically conscious government officials. If
the cost of lawsuits increases more in a given state than in others, that
state may lose business to other states, with concomitant ripple
effects. Allowing too many lawsuits clogs the courts. True redundancy
of procedure, standards of proof and remedy should be avoided.
On the other hand, if less money is accorded the employee, he
must bear more losses himself. This affects his family and his
potential as a consumer, and may burden private and public social
services. If he has less control over the lawsuit, he may have less
psychological satisfaction from the lawsuit, and he may be made less
whole in other ways that matter to him. Allowance of the tort
benefits not only the individual, but also the general public, in that it
aids enforcement of the statute. Workers talk to and about each
other, and they read the newspaper. If they perceive that
whistleblowers wind up getting hung out to dry, fewer people will
blow the whistle. Fuller remedies encourage the initial reporting of
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the OSHA violation and discourage the violation of section 11(c).
Employees and the general public benefit from a safer workplace.
The far reaching boundaries of these myriad concerns, and the
political subtexts that accompany them, have led some courts to defer
to the legislature before "creating" the tort duty.343 However, courts
in most states have been willing to reach this general policy decision
on their own.
Courts should concentrate on the large policy issues, and should
not get confused by, or hide behind, doctrines of federal preemption,
statutory exclusivity, or the like. The public policy tort goes to larger
employment matters than does section 11(c); the differing remedies
and procedures are not duplicative, but rather they reveal the
differing goals of the actions. Although the tort affects enforcement
of the OSHAct, it is not preempted by either the letter or the policies
of federal preemption doctrine. Congress has manifested no intent to
preempt state wrongful discharge actions. Similarly, the public policy
tort is not merely a private right of action for section 11(c).
A state court is free to decide that federal statutory remedies are
sufficient for its citizen employees if they are wrongfully fired. But
another state court is equally free to provide a procedure which will
give its citizens more money or more control than the federal statute.
The measure of the harm that has befallen a wrongfully fired worker
is usually more than the back pay amount. Usually tort recovery will
come closer than the section 11(c) recovery to restoring the worker to
where he or she would have been but for the wrong. Given the
importance of safe employment and the widespread public benefits
that result from disclosure and prevention of OSHA violations, a
state court that allows the public policy tort may well have made the
better choice.
If a state court makes such a determination, it is within its
traditional common law roles, roles that pre-date the OSHAct. A
state court may properly use its police powers to protect the health
and safety of state residents. Regulation of the employment
relationship and creation of tort duties are among the established
tasks of state courts. When state courts enhance the rights and
remedies of OSHA whistleblowers, they are acting pursuant to the
design of the OSHAct, which contemplated that the federal
legislation would set a floor but not a ceiling for worker protection.
343. Murphy Am. Home Prods. Corp., 448 N.E.2d 86 (N.Y. 1983).
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IV. CONCLUSION
Most people, encountering an employee who was fired in true,
intentional retaliation for reporting a serious OSHA violation, would
seek to return him to his rightful position, to where he would have
been but for the wrongful discharge. This article has mapped out two
paths. One, section 11(c), may not get him quite to his rightful
position. The other, the state public policy tort, may get him closer
because of greater compensatory damages, more possibility of
punitive damages, and greater employee control of the process. But
that second path may have higher costs to the state. State courts are
within their province if they choose to bar plaintiffs from this path.
But if they do, they should state policy reasons for doing so, not
stumble over the misplaced road blocks discussed in this article,
namely, fear that allowing the public policy tort amounts to allowing a
private right of action, that the statute is exclusive, or that federal
preemption is present. If the public policy tort exists in the state for
most whistleblowers, nothing in the OSHAct leads to a different
conclusion in the case of the OSHA whistleblower.
